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INTRODUCTION'
In 1837, the United States entered into a Treaty with several
Bands of Chippewa Indians. Under the terms of this
Treaty... the United States guaranteed to the Indians
certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded
land .... After an examination of the historical record, we
conclude that the Chippewa retain the usufructuary rights
guaranteed to them under the 1837 Treaty.
- Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
2
In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians (Mille
Lacs), a closely divided 5-4 opinion on the merits before the Court
1. Land use and environmental regulation implications of treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property interests arising in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians (Mille Lacs), 526 U.S. 172 (1999), in a broad sense, were first
discussed by this Author in a short article that described the background to the
1837 Treaty and majority and dissenting opinions in the 5-4 opinion on the merits.
See Peter Erlinder, Treaty- Guaranteed Usufructuary Rights: Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians Ten Years On, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10921 (2011), available at http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10921/treaty-
guaranteed-usufructuary-rights-minnesota-v-mille-lacs-band-chippewa-in
[hereinafter Erlinder, Ten Years On]. The article was the first to point out that the
closely-divided opinion disguised the Court's unanimity on the nature and origin of
treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property interests. See id. The present Article
builds upon this Author's 2011 article by applying the Mille Lacs usufructuary
property analysis to pre-1837 treaties and long-decided "Minnesota treaty cases" to
reveal the limited scope of "treaty rights" recognized prior to the Mille Lacs
analysis. This provides a new way of understanding 160-year-old treaties and long-
standing precedent and is likely to become even more far-reaching with time, as
recent cases arising in civil regulatory and criminal contexts are beginning to
demonstrate.
2. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 175-76.
2015]
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analyzing the continuing viability of the hunting, fishing, and
gathering guarantees in an 1837 Treaty, which ceded territory to
the United States, masked a unanimous opinion establishing the
analytical methodology for finding such "usufructuary property"
guarantees in the language used by U.S. treaty negotiators to
sever the continuing right to use land for the survival of its
inhabitants from mere "title" to real property.3 This "use of the
land for survival purposes" has been denominated "usufructuary
property" since Roman times4 and is but one of the "sticks" that
make up the fee simple "bundle of sticks," long recognized in the
common law as alienable from mere formal title.
Unanimity Within a Divided Opinion: Treaty-Created
Usufructuary Property Rights
By separating "title" from "use," U.S. treaty negotiators
created treaty-guaranteed property interests which, like
subsurface mineral rights or utility easements, do not transfer
with "title."'  Created by the language of treaties between
sovereigns, these property interests may not be lawfully taken
from the indigenous nations without specific congressional
authorization to abrogate the property interests memorialized in a
treaty between sovereigns.7 Moreover, the abrogation of treaties
with native people must be expressed in language that clearly
reflects the intention of Congress to do so and is clearly
understood as such by the Anishinabe.8
The Mille Lacs majority and dissenting opinions agreed with
this principle and differed only as to whether the 1837 Treaty-
guaranteed usufructuary property rights had been abrogated by
one or more of three subsequent events: (a) an 1850 Executive
Order by President Zachary Taylor, that purported to limit the
Anishinabe to sovereign territory in Minnesota outside of the 1837
Treaty-ceded territory which was the remainder of Minnesota at
3. See Michael R. Newhouse, Recognizing and Preserving Native American
Treaty Usufructs in the Supreme Court: The Mille Lacs Case, 21 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 169, 193-94 (2000).
4. Usufruct, n. [fr. Latin usufructus] Roman & civil law. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). "A right ... to use and enjoy the fruits of another's
property for a period without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any
natural deterioration in the property over time." Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 535 (1976) (codifying the definition of"usufruct"). See 31 C.J.S. Estates §§ 2-5,
8, 15-21, 116-28, 137, 243 (2014).
5. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 175-76.
6. Id. at 176.




that time as recognized by Treaties of 1825 and 1826;' (b) an 1855
Treaty also ceded territory but did not mention abrogation of any
usufructuary rights guaranteed in the 1854 Treaty and all prior
treaties;0 or, (c) Minnesota's 1858 Statehood Act, which the
Supreme Court had examined before, but never found to have
abrogated pre-existing usufructuary property rights in prior U.S.
treaties."
The Mille Lacs dissent did not question that usufructuary
property rights, guaranteed in an 1854 Treaty referenced by the
majority, had been upheld by the Seventh Circuit and recognized
by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) a
decade earlier in the 1854-ceded territory in the eastern part of
Minnesota north of Lake Superior.1 2 The Mille Lacs dissent did
note the same 1854 Treaty specifically referred to the rest of
Minnesota (then covered only by the 1825 and 1826 "sovereignty
Treaties" and the 1837 "cession") as being unchanged by the 1854
Treaty.3 The majority agreed with the well-established principle
that congressional abrogation of treaty-guaranteed property rights
was not to be lightly inferred. 4  Further, the majority
acknowledged that treaties and congressional enactments must be
liberally interpreted, as understood by the Indians.
15
Ojibwe Usufructuary Property Rights in Northern
Minnesota
With respect to the usufructuary property interests of the
Chippewa/Ojibwe in the rest of Minnesota (outside the 1837-
ceded territory), two major questions remain after the Mille Lacs
opinion regarding the scope of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
property interests of the Ojibwe. First, did the Anishinabe have
treaty-guaranteed usufructuary rights in the rest of Northern
Minnesota outside the 1837-ceded territory at that time, or did
they possess merely "aboriginal title" or "Indian title" upon which
9. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188.
10. Id. at 195.
11. Id. at 202.
12. Id. at 208-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 202 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
738-40 (1986); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
15. Id. at 196 (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979)).
16. The terms Chippewa, Ojibwe, and Anishinabe are used interchangeably




to base later claims, as nearly all courts have assumed?17 Second,
if the Ojibwe did possess treaty-guaranteed usufructuary rights in
the rest of Minnesota outside the 1837-ceded territory, are those
property interests also as valid today as they are within the 1837-
ceded territory, as the Supreme Court held in the Mille Lacs
opinion? Treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property interests in
the whole of Northern Minnesota, that are still valid today, would
have a significant impact on the environmental and economic
future of Northern Minnesota and its native people.
This Article answers these questions by elaborating treaty
history to include the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
guaranteed by the U.S. government in Minnesota territory before
1837, which include: (a) the 1795 Treaty of Greenville; (b) the 1825
Treaty of Prairie du Chien; (c) the 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac of
Lake Superior; and (d) a relatively-unrecognized clause of the
1854 Treaty that explicitly guarantees "the Chippewas of the
Mississippi" usufructuary property rights in un-ceded territory
west of the 1854 Treaty-ceded territory boundary.18 In light of the
usufructuary property rights analysis unanimously adopted by the
Supreme Court in Mille Lacs, which builds upon the analysis in
the earlier Lac Courte Oreilles (LCO) cases in the Seventh
Circuit, the Article concludes that these treaties-which remain
largely unexamined in legal literature and case law ° for the
simple reason that they did not cede territory to the United States
and have been of little interest to those researching land-cession
issues-are an unrecognized source of treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property rights across all of Northern Minnesota,
both on and off reservations.21
17. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D.
Minn. 1971).
18. Treaty with the Chippewas art. 1, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Sept. 30, 1854, 10
Stat. 1109 [hereinafter Treaty of 1854]. Territory west of the 1854 Treaty
boundary, including territory where the Leech Lake, Red Lake, and White Earth
Reservations are now located, remained the domain of the sovereign Anishinabe
Nation and was the subject of subsequent land cession treaties and congressional
enactments for the next fifty years. See infra Appendices I and II.
19. See, e.g., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin (LCO I), 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
20. But see Mole Lake Band v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 596 (1953); State v.
Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1980).
21. An earlier version of the Article, which was published in the Environmental
Law Reporter, focused on the implication of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
property rights as a new source of tribal-based environmental regulation in treaty
territory where protection of the right to derive a "modest living" from exercising
usufructuary property rights is guaranteed by federal treaties. See Erlinder, Ten
Years On, supra note 1, at 10922.
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These Treaties recognized the sovereignty of the Dakota and
Anishinabe nations and changed the nature of the rights held by
both the Dakota and Anishinabe from inchoate "aboriginal rights"
(or "Indian title") as has been assumed by most Minnesota
jurists,22 into "treaty-guaranteed" usufructuary property rights
which the Mille Lacs opinion teaches are the source of a
developing jurisprudence in the 21" century.23 Once these "treaty
rights" are understood as a form of "property," constitutional due
process protections advanced by the "property-rights movement"
must protect "treaty property rights" as any other intangible
property interest (such as an easement or a sub-surface mineral
right).4  A fundamental thesis of the Article is that re-
conceptualizing "treaty rights" as "property interests" requires a
complete reassessment of the constitutional treatment of those
interests under the Due Process Clause.
Modern Usufructuary Property Rights, Sovereignty, and
Natural Resources
Because usufructuary property rights include "the right to
modest living, 2 5 environmental protection to maintain the long-
term value of these property rights will have significant long-term
off-reservation land use and wildlife management implications for
tribal governments and tribal members. Of late, federal
prosecutions of tribal members for violations of the federal Lacey
Act, predicated on tribal members' violation of tribal game
regulations, are direct violations of the sovereignty explicitly
guaranteed in the exercise of usufructuary property rights in the
heart of "Indian Country.2 7 Some of these prosecutions have been
dismissed by federal district court judges who recognized that,
22. See Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1001.
23. Memorandum Opinion and Order Rejecting the Reports and
Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, United States v. Lyons, Case No. 13-70
(Nov. 25, 2013), available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/90-dct-
order-rejecting-mj-rr.pdf [hereinafter Tunheim Order].
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin
(LCO VI), 686 F. Supp. 226, 233 (W.D. Wis. 1988). See Erlinder, Ten Years On,
supra note 1, at 10922.
26. See infra Part V.A.
27. For example, "Operation Squarehook" was an undercover "sting" operation
in which a large number of tribal band members were prosecuted under the federal
Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2012), for wildlife violations. See Doug Smith
& Dennis Anderson, 3-Year Walleye-Poaching Probe Nets More Charges in




while usufructuary rights established by treaties between
sovereigns may be abrogated by Congress with a clear intention to
do so (in language understood by both parties to accomplish that
result), these rights cannot be set aside as merely incidental to a
federal statute.28
Further, because usufructuary property rights include "the
right to a modest living,"2 where these property rights have been
guaranteed by treaty with the federal government, shared
management and shared income as co-equals with state
governments is mandated, either through joint state/native
management or state leasing of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
rights. Environmental protection to maintain the long-term value
of the usufructuary property rights for the Anishinabe will be
necessary in all of Northern Minnesota." This, in turn, will have
land-use management implications far beyond wildlife harvest
management and promises both a broadened role for tribal
governments in land-use decisions 1 and a potential source of
income for some of Northern Minnesota's most impoverished
citizens."
The survival of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
interests through subsequent transfer of title is already well
established; for example, the Supreme Court held nearly fifty
years ago that, even after the Menominee Reservation became
Menominee County, Wisconsin, the treaty-guaranteed rights of
the Menominee people continued to run with the land even after
Congress terminated the Reservation itself.33 Absent another act
28. Tunheim Order, supra note 23. See also Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that the Menominee Tribe's hunting
and fishing rights survived an act of Congress which did not explicitly eliminate
them).
29. Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra note 1, at 10922.
30. See Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See also Patrick Reis,
Obama Admin Strikes $3.4B Deal in Indian Trust Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/08/O8greenwire-obama-admin-strikes
-34b-deal-in-indian-trust-l-92369.html (reporting a settlement for mismanagement
of Native American land trusts); Tribal Nations Issues and Perspectives, GREAT
LAKES REG'L COLLABORATION 17 (Apr. 26, 2005), http://glrc.us/documents/strategy
/GLRC-Tribal-Briefing-Paper.pdf [hereinafter Tribal Nations Issues and
Perspectives] (discussing the federal government's trust responsibility).
31. See LCO I, 700 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1983).
32. See Jeffrey Robert Connolly, Northern Wisconsin Reacts to Court
Interpretations of Indian Treaty Rights to Natural Resources, 11 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 116 (2007). The issues in this Article are limited to an
examination of Anishinabe treaties with the United States, although a similar
analytical approach would apply to Dakota/Lakota treaties, or those with other
Indian nations. See Newhouse, supra note 3.
33. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412-13.
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of Congress separately abrogating the usufructuary property
interests in addition to the termination of the Reservation, the
usufructuary property interests of the Menominee people continue
undiminished in what is now Menominee County, Wisconsin.34
A similar principle had already been applied to the 1854
Treaty territory by the Seventh Circuit and recognized by both
Wisconsin and Minnesota. 5  The Supreme Court adopted this
analysis in deciding the Mille Lacs case. Application of the Mille
Lacs usufructuary property analysis to the territory described in
treaties with the Chippewa would apply to all of Northern
Minnesota, particularly the Treaties of 1825 and 1826 which have
guaranteed usufructuary property interests not only on
reservations, but also on the broad swath of territory described by
Lakota/Sioux sovereign territory boundary, extending north to the
Canadian border.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE RESTORATION OF CHIPPEWA
TREATY-GUARANTEED USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN NORTHERN MINNESOTA 6
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the
Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from
them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and
liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just
and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in
justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made for
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving
peace and friendship with them.
- Northwest Ordinance, 178737
Through a series of cases brought in federal courts to enforce
and define the treaty rights guaranteed to tribes and tribal
members, a body of federal case law has developed that firmly
establishes the concept of tribal sovereignty38 on the order of that
34. Id.
35. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 188 (1999); LCO I, 700 F.2d at 341.
36. Portions of this Section on historical background were drawn from the
introductory article on this issue by the Author. See Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra
note 1.
37. AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED
STATES NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO ch. 8, art. 3, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1787)
[hereinafter NORTHWEST ORDINANCE].




enjoyed by the separate states within the federal union." In
addition, congressional passage of Public Law 280"° in 1953
established tribal authority over a wide range of administrative
41
and civil-regulatory matters, which served to reinforce the tribal
regulatory power but limited sovereignty over criminal matters on
reservations 42 in the six states in which Public Law 280 applies.
43
B.1 Government-to-Government Relationships
The government-to-government relationship implicit in federal treaty
making and in the federal trust responsibility toward Tribal Nations and
individual tribal members has been expanded over time to include the full
gamut of federal policy implementation by all federal agencies.
This relationship requires federal agencies to interact directly with Tribal
Nations on a governmental basis, not merely as a segment of the general
public:
* This obligation is separate and distinct from obligations to
states and other governments as well as from requirements affording
the opportunity for general public input on federal decisions.
* Federal agencies are to consult with tribal governments
and their designated governmental representatives, to the greatest
extent practical and as not otherwise prohibited by law, before taking
actions that affect tribal lands, resources, people, or treaty rights.
Many states, such as Michigan and Wisconsin, have adopted government-
to-government consultation policies similar to that required of the federal
government.
39. State v. Losh, 755 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 2008) ("Indian Tribes retain
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and ... tribal sovereignty is
dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.")
(citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987)
(quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 154 (1980); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
40. Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280 (1953) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1324 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). See
Losh, 755 N.W.2d at 739.
41. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207-14 (holding that Public Law 280
authorized on-reservation state criminal jurisdiction, but limited state jurisdiction
over civil and regulatory matters).
42. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). But see United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193, 197 (2004) (recognizing "the inherent power of Indian tribes ... to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians," 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), but only when
tribal institutions are sufficient and the alleged violator is a member of the band or
tribe in question); State v. Davis, 773 N.W.2d 66, 70-71 (Minn. 2009) (concluding
that the various Anishinabe Bands are separable entities).
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006):
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of
Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the
same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses
committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws
[Vol. 33: 143
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In Minnesota, on-reservation tribal sovereignty has been
recognized with respect to functions similar to state-government
civil functions,44 such as the regulation of gaming,5 motor vehicle
registration,46 traffic,4 7 sale of tobacco and other state-regulated
commodities , on-reservation enforcement of tribal conservation ,
and state court enforcement of tribal court civil judgments.50
However, except in the 1854 Treaty area in the Arrowhead, the
recognition of off-reservation hunting, fishing, and gathering
usufructuary rights has not kept pace with the development of on-
reservation tribal civil regulatory sovereignty. 1
A. The Late 20h Century Grassroots Activism: The Rule of
Law Returns After 160 Years of Systemic Usufructuary
Property Theft
More than a decade before Mille Lacs reached the Supreme
Court, members of Anishinabe Bands in Wisconsin began a series
of organized attempts to exercise rights to hunt, fish, and gather
in areas of Wisconsin ceded to the United States by an 1854
Treaty, which specifically stated that, like in the 1837 Treaty, the
Anishinabe retained the use of the land for hunting, fishing, and
gathering. 2 News accounts of the period reported heated debates
and threats of physical violence between non-natives who did not
of such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory: [i.e.,
Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin].
44. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., Minn., 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (state taxation).
45. See, e.g., Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 212 (tribal gambling). See also Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2014) [hereinafter IGRA]
(regulating "the conduct of gaming on Indian Lands").
46. See, e.g., LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TRAFFIC CODE ch. 200, § 213 (2000)
(motor vehicle registration).
47. See, e.g., State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 1997) (traffic laws); see
also LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TRAFFIC CODE ch. 200, §§ 201-18 (2000) (same).
48. See, e.g., LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TAXATION CODE tit. 5, ch. 2, Tobacco
Tax, §§ 5.201-5.209 (2009) (tobacco sales).
49. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Dir.,
Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 141 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1998) (treaty-reserved fishing
rights); LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE CONSERVATION CODE tit. 11, ch. I (2012)
(regulations such as issuance of fishing permits).
50. See, e.g., Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Gaming Enter. v.
Prescott, 779 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); see also LEECH LAKE BAND OF
OJIBWE JUDICIAL CODE tit. 2, R. 60, adopted Nov. 21, 2000 (rule of procedure
regarding Full Faith and Credit and Comity); Minn. Gen. Rules of Practice, Dist.
Cts., R.10.01 (2014).
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. See Treaty of 1854, supra note 18.
Law and Inequality
understand the meaning of federal treaties and tribal members
who were engaging in traditional practices that the Wisconsin
DNR had outlawed. 3 The result of nearly a decade of activism and
litigation was a Seventh Circuit decision upholding Anishinabe
usufructuary property rights in the 1854-ceded territory in Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt 4
and related cases (LCO litigation)55 that preceded the Mille Lacs
litigation by more than a decade and were cited by the district
court, the Eighth Circuit, 7 and the Supreme Court.s
Drawing, at least in part, on the activism that brought the
1854 Treaty and Anishinabe usufructuary property rights back to
life in Wisconsin, in the spring of 2010 several dozen members of
the White Earth and Leech Lake Bands of Anishinabe announced
a public ceremony within the territory governed by an 1855 Treaty
with the United States, during which they would use traditional
nets rather than state-DNR-approved methods to harvest fish the
day before the "fishing opener. 5' DNR officers seized the nets, but
made no arrests."0
Segments of the non-Indian public and media applauded the
Minnesota DNR's assertion of sole authority over Anishinabe off-
reservation hunting, fishing, and gathering, and called for "equal
rights for non-Indians." 1  Recent "grass-roots" activism by
53. See LARRY NESPER, THE WALLEYE WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR OJIBWE
SPEARFISHING AND TREATY RIGHTS (2002).
54. LCO I, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
55. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin
(LCO I), 760 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO III), 758 F. Supp. 1262 (W.D. Wis. 1991); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO IV),
740 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO V), 707 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D. Wis. 1989); LCO
VI, 686 F. Supp. 226, 233 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO VII), 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis.
1987); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin
(LCO VIII), 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
56. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota (Mille Lacs 11), 952 F.
Supp. 1362 (D. Minn. 1997); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota
(Mille Lacs III), 861 F. Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994).
57. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota (Mille Lacs V), 124
F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997).
58. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
59. Tom Roberts, Band Members Continue Plan to Assert Tribal Rights with
Protest, MINN. PUB. RADIO (May 4, 2010), available at http://minnesota.publicradio
.org/display/web/2010/05/04/ojibwe-treaty-rights.
60. Id.
61. See Minnesota v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). Stephen
Fellegy, a non-Indian, caught a walleye out of season, protesting what he views to
be the state's unjust, favorable treatment of Ojibwe, the Native Americans whose
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organized tribal members asserting treaty rights, 2 similar to the
organized activism of Wisconsin tribal members that brought
about recognition of treaty rights in Wisconsin in the 1980s, 3 is a
sign that neither the State of Minnesota nor the Bureau of Indian
Affairs nor tribal governments who have failed to act so far, will be
able to ignore the implications of the Mille Lacs opinion for much
longer. 4
B. Usufructuary Property in Sovereign Ojibwe Territory:
The Northwest Ordinance and the "Forgotten Treaties"
of 1795, 1825, 1826, and 1854
Detailed histories of the 1837, 1854 (Wisconsin), and 1855
Treaties are well canvassed in both the district court opinions in
the Mille Lacs and previous LCO litigation 5 regarding the 1854
Treaty, but the statutes and treaties that preceded the first
cession of Minnesota territory in 1837 (i.e., the Treaties of 1795,
1825, and 1826, all of which covered the territory ceded by
Anishinabe in 1837 and after) were not analyzed in light of the
treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property analysis adopted
unanimously by the Court in the Mille Lacs opinion. But, each of
those treaties guaranteed hunting, fishing, and gathering rights to
the Anishinabe on the territory of what is now Minnesota, which,
like the 1837, 1854, and 1855 Treaties, have never been abrogated
treaty rights exempt them from prosecution for violating the state's fishing
restrictions on Lake Mille Lacs. Id. at 702-06.
62. Dennis Anderson, Chippewa to Fish Early in Treaty Clash, STAR TRIB. (Apr.
21, 2010), http://www. startribune.com1ocal/91716694.html.
63. See NESPER, supra note 53; Dirk Johnson, Indian Fishing Dispute Upsets
North Woods' Quiet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988
/04/24/us/indian-fishing-dispute-upsets-north-woods-quiet.html; Dirk Johnson,
Indian Hunting Rights Ignite a Wisconsin Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/16/us/indian-hunting-rights-ignite-a-wisconsin-
dispute.html.
64. See Letter from Karen R. Driver, Chairwoman of the Reservation Bus.
Comm., Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, to Burl W. Haar, Exec.
Sec'y, Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n (Sept. 29, 2014), available at https://www.edockets.
state .mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments .do?method=showPoup&documentI
d=74CF238E-151F-4307-B81E-5DE9FEE620D7}&documentTitle=20149-103433-
01 (responding to the proposed Sandpiper oil pipeline project before the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission, Docket Nos. PPL 6668/CN-13-473 and PPL 6668/PPL
13-474).
65. See LCO 11, 760 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); LCO III, 758 F. Supp. 1262 (W.D.
Wis. 1991); LCO IV, 740 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990); LCO V, 707 F. Supp. 1034
(W.D. Wis. 1989); LCO VI, 686 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Wis. 1988); LCO VII, 668 F.
Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987); LCO VIII, 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
66. Mille Lacs 11, 952 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Minn. 1997); Mille Lacs III, 861 F.
Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994).
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by treaty or specific congressional enactment, as the Supreme
Court found in the Mille Lacs opinion.
As late as 1863, U.S. treaty negotiators-for example, early
Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey-were still verbally
promising that the Anishinabe would retain the hunting, fishing,
and gathering rights on ten million acres of newly-ceded territory
for an indefinite period. 7 Although the U.S. negotiators did not
put these promises in writing in the 1854 Treaty, the 1855 Treaty
approved by Congress only months later was interpreted by the
Court in the Mille Lacs opinion to retain the usufructuary rights
previously agreed upon. 8 This series of previously uninterpreted
treaties takes on new significance in interpreting the silence of all
later treaties on the question of usufructuary rights.
The 1787 Northwest Ordinance:0 Native American
"Property, Rights, and Liberty"
The Northwest Territory, stretching from the Ohio Valley to
Minnesota, was not incorporated into the United States until the
1783 Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the American Colonies'
war for political independence. 1 Four years later, the Continental
Congress declared its intention with respect to Native peoples
residing in the newly-gained territory by enacting the Northwest
Ordinance,2 which provided the first legal structure to govern the
new territory. National policy towards the Indians in all of the
Northwest Territory was to be: "[Glood faith ... towards the
Indians; their.., property shall never be taken from them without
their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they never
shall be invaded or disturbed. . . ."" Before the Constitution was
ratified in 1787, before a federal executive or judiciary had been
67. Treaty with the Chippewa-Red Lake and Pembina Bands 1863, U.S.-
Tribal Nation, Oct. 2, 1863, 13 Stat. 667 [hereinafter Treaty of Old Crossing]. The
Senate ratified the Treaty of Old Crossing, with amendments, on March 1, 1864.
Id. Amendments were assented to on April 12, 1864, and it was proclaimed by the
President of the United States on May 5, 1864. Id. The Treaty did not mention
hunting and fishing rights, "but the transcript of Ramsey's negotiations with the
Band makes clear that the Indians were promised they could continue to hunt and
fish on the ceded land until it was settled." United States v. Minnesota, 466 F.
Supp. 1382, 1383 (D. Minn. 1979).
68. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).
69. See infra Part III.
70. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 37.
71. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his
Britannic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 80-82 [hereinafter
Treaty of Paris].
72. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 37.
73. Id. at art. 3.
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established, and, perhaps most significantly, before even a
standing army capable of occupying or defending the huge new
Northwest Territory could be mustered by a centralized
government,4 the nation's policy of respect for Indian property
rights was established by the United States.75
The 1795 Treaty of Greenville"
The 1795 Treaty of Greenville was a peace treaty between
the United States and the Anishinabe and other tribes, which
established a dividing line between territory claimed by the
United States within the Northwest Territory and the Indian
Territory over which the United States had no claim. It was
negotiated only a few years after the ratification of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.8 A peace treaty with the
tribes and a promise of loyalty to the United States served the
interests of the new nation, and treaty negotiator General
Anthony Wayne's respect for Indian property was matched with a
guarantee of continued rights of a usufructuary nature. " Article V
of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville applied in the territory occupied
74. See Mole Lake Band v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 596 (1953). As late as the
War of 1812, the Anishinabe were "associated" with Great Britain as the Treaty of
September 8, 1815 declared:
Whereas the Chippewa ... were associated with Great Britain in the late
war between the United States and that power, and have manifested a
disposition to be restored to the relations of peace and amity with the said
States ....
Id. at 604. See also A Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Wyadot, Delaware, Seneca, Shawanoe, Miami, Chippewa, Ottawa, and
Potawatimie, Tribes of Indians, Residing Within the Limits of the State of Ohio,
and the Territories of Indiana and Michigan, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Sept. 8, 1815, 7
Stat. 131 [hereinafter Treaty of September 8, 1815].
75. This was more than seventy-five years before Minnesota was carved out of
the Northwest Territory to become a state. Minnesota Statehood Enabling Act, ch.
50, 11 Stat. 166-67 (1857).
76. A Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Tribes of
Indians, Called the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawas, Chippewas,
Putawatimes, Miamis, EelR-iver, Weea's, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and
Kaskaskias, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49 [hereinafter Treaty of
Greenville].
77. See Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1980).
78. However, it was not until 1803 that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),
established the role of the Supreme Court in the separation of powers framework,
which raises some question as to post hoc interpretations of the Treaty of
Greenville later in the 19 Century.
79. See Treaty of Greenville, supra note 76.
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by the Anishinabe, which includes what is now Minnesota,
provided:
The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly
to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long
as they please, without any molestation from the United
States; but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be
disposed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to be
sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the United
States will protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet
enjoyment of their lands against all citizens of the United
States, and against all other white persons who intrude upon
the same. And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge
themselves to be under the protection of the said United
States and no other power whatever.
Article VI gave both the United States and the Anishinabe the
right to drive off any White person, even if the person was a
citizen of the United States who settled in the Treaty territory,
and it established a western boundary between land claimed by
the United States and Indian Territory.81
The 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien
8 2
Neither the Treaty of Greenville nor the 1825 Treaty of
Prairie du Chien ceded territory to the United States. But, U.S.
treaty negotiators did prevail upon Chippewa/Anishinabe and
Sioux/Dakota 3 to separate their overlapping 1795 Treaty-
guaranteed rights to hunt, fish, and gather anywhere they pleased
in the Northwest Territory." The Dakota and Anishinabe applied
their own methods of inter-tribal regulation, but the 1825 Treaty
formalized these aboriginal claims into sovereign treaty-
guaranteed domains-the Anishinabe in Northern Minnesota and
the Dakota to the south15 -with disputes to be resolved with the
assistance of the United States, a signatory to the Treaty:
80. Id. at art. V.
81. Id. at art. VI.
82. Treaty with the Sioux and Chippewa, Sacs and Fox, Menominie, Joway,
Sioux, Winnebago, and a portion of the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawattomie,
Tribes, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Aug. 19, 1825, 7 Stat. 272 [hereinafter 1825 Treaty of
Prairie du Chien].
83. The "Dakota," a Great Plains culture, inhabited the eastern range of the
Lakota language group, which also included the Nakota languages. Anishinabe
called them Nadowessioux (little-snakes, or little-enemies). The French shortened
the name given to them by their enemies to "Sioux." Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra
note 1, at n.28. This Article will refer to the Lakota groups inhabiting Minnesota
as the Dakota.
84. See 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82; Erlinder, Ten Years On,
supra note 1.




The United States of America ... to promote peace among
these tribes, and to establish boundaries among them ... have
invited the Chippewa... [and] Sioux... to assemble
together... to accomplish these objects; ... and after full
deliberation, the said tribes.., have agreed with the United
States, and with one another, upon the following ar8t
The three-party nature of the Treaty suggests that the United
States recognized the claims of each sovereign entity and acted as
guarantor of the Treaty terms. Formerly inchoate "native title"
claims to the territory in question were transformed into "treaty
guaranteed" usufructuary property interests that were to have a
much different standing in the law than might have been
anticipated in the early-19l Century.87
There can be no serious dispute that the United States
initiated the 1825 Treaty negotiations," acted as facilitator,"
committed the Treaty terms to writing,0 and signed the Treaty as
a party." Although the United States did not seek land cessions
for itself from the Anishinabe, the 1825 Treaty did serve the
interests of the United States on a frontier that was difficult to
defend, considering it was ratified only a decade after the War of
1812-a war in which many Indian tribes in the Northwest
Territory had openly sided with the British:
Article 10.
All the tribes aforesaid acknowledge the general controlling
power of the United States, and disclaim all dependence upon,
and connection with, any other power. And the United States
agree to, and recognize, the preceding boundaries, subject to
the limitations and restrictions before provided ....
The terms of the 1825 Treaty give additional substance to
Anishinabe oral tradition in that the United States had promised
them both sovereignty and the right to the wild game in Northern
Minnesota. Moreover, along with the 1795 Treaty, the 1825
Treaty provides concrete evidence as to the Anishinabe
understanding of later treaties.93 The 1837 Treaty was quite
86. Id.
87. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
88. See 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82.
89. See id.
90. See id. There is no record that the 1825 Treaty terms reserving
usufructuary rights were abrogated by treaty or statute with respect to the
Anishinabe, although this is not the case with respect to the Dakota following the
1862 conflict, following which Dakota (Sioux) treaties were abrogated by Congress.
91. Id. at 275.
92. Id. at 274-75.
93. Id.; see also Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra note 1.
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explicit in describing the continuing right to hunt, fish, and gather
in ceded territory, but, like the 1863 Treaty based on Governor
Ramsey's verbal promise, 4 others seem less well articulated.
However, from the oral tradition of the Anishinabe and the
written language of the 1825 "sovereignty" treaty, all parties,
including the United States, recognized that the Anishinabe had
the right to the wild game on the territory encompassed by the
1825 Treaty:
Article 13.
It is understood by all the tribes, parties hereto, that no tribe
shall hunt within the acknowledged limits of any other
without their assent ... the Chiefs of all the tribes ... allow a
reciprocal right of hunting on the lands of one another,
permission being first asked and obtained ....
Moreover, Article 15 of the 1825 Treaty also demonstrates that the
United States intended to be bound by the terms of the treaty:
"This treaty shall be obligatory on the tribes, parties hereto, from
and after the date hereof, and on the United States, from and after
its ratification by the government thereof."9' The 1795 Treaty and
1825 Treaty converted inchoate aboriginal claims into treaty-
recognized property rights of a usufructuary nature, based on the
same canons of Indian treaty construction described by the
Supreme Court in the Mille Lacs decision. 97
The 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac of Lake Superior9'
By its own terms, the 1825 Treaty provided that a second
treaty council with the Anishinabe on Lake Superior would be
organized by the United States in 1826 to explain the terms of the
1825 Treaty to the widely-scattered Anishinabe who could not be
present at the 1825 Treaty negotiations in Prairie du Chien on the
Mississippi.99 As promised, a secondary treaty was entered into on
94. See Treaty of Old Crossing, supra note 67; Red Lake Band of Chippewa v.
Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp.
1382, 1383 (D. Minn. 1979).
95. 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 275.
96. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
97. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
98. Articles of a Treaty Made and Concluded at the Fond du Lac of Lake
Superior, This Fifth Day of August, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Twenty-Six, Between Lewis Cass and Thomas L. McKenney,
Commissioners on the Part of the United States, and the Chippewa Tribe of
Indians, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Aug. 5, 1826, 7 Stat. 290 [hereinafter 1826 Treaty of
Fond du Lac].




August 5, 1826,1"' which refers to the 1825 Treaty in its opening
clause:
Whereas a Treaty was concluded at Prairie du Chien in
August last, by which the war, which has been so long carried
on, to their mutual distress, between the Chippewas and
Sioux, was happily terminated by the intervention of the
United States; and whereas, owing to the remote and
dispersed situation of the Chippewas ... the United States
agreed to assemble the Chippewa Tribe upon Lake Superior
during the present year, in order to give full effect to the said
Treaty, to explain its stipulations and to call upon the whole
Chippewa tribe, assembled at their general council fire, to give
their formal assent thereto, that the peace which has been
concluded may be rendered permanent...."'
The 1826 Treaty provides, on its face, the evidence that both U.S.
treaty negotiators and the Anishinabe understood that the ability
of Anishinabe to live off the land was essential to their survival.
1 2
Article 3 acknowledges Anishinabe title in the land, and
continuing "jurisdiction" over the ancestral territory that had been
held and occupied under "Indian title"1 03 but now recognized by
treaty with the U.S. Government: "The Chippewa tribe grant to
the government of the United States the right to search for, and
carry away any metals or minerals from any part of their country.
But this grant is not to affect the title of the land, nor the existing
jurisdiction over it. '104
Further, Article 5 describes, almost painfully, the diminished
condition and bleak agricultural prospects observed by the treaty
negotiators in 1826:
In consideration of the poverty of the Chippewas, and of the
The Chippewa tribe being dispersed over a great extent of country, and the
Chiefs of that tribe having requested, that such portion of them as may be
thought proper, by the Government of the United States, may be
assembled in 1826, upon some part of Lake Superior, that the objects and
advantages of this treaty may be fully explained to them, so that the
stipulations thereof may be observed by the warriors. The Commissioners
of the United States assent thereto, and it is therefore agreed that a
council shall accordingly be held for these purposes.
100. 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98.
101. Id. at 269.
102. Id.
103. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D.
Minn. 1971).
104. 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98, at 269 (emphasis added). Note:
With respect to future interests the Anishinabe might claim in resource extraction,
nothing in the Treaty suggests that the metals may be carried away without
payment for the metals or minerals, or recuperation of the environment to protect
the ability of the Anishinabe to hunt, fish and gather afterward. Id.
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sterile nature of the country they inhabit, unfit for cultivation,
and almost destitute of game, and as a proof of regard on the
part of the United States, it is agreed that an annuity of two
thousand dollars, in money or goods, as the President may
direct, shall be paid to the tribe.., during the pleasure of the
Congress of the United States.05
Finally, Article 7 displays a spark of humanity in the U.S. treaty
negotiators who were so moved by the conditions of poverty they
observed among the Chippewa at Fond du Lac that they went
beyond their congressional mandate to alleviate the poverty they
observed:
The necessity for the stipulations in the fourth, fifth and sixth
articles of this treaty could be fully apparent, only from
personal observation of the condition, prospects, and wishes of
the Chippewas, and the Commissioners were therefore not
specifically instructed upon the subjects therein referred to;
but seeing the extreme poverty of these wretched people,
finding them almost naked and starving, and ascertaining
that many perished during the last winter, from hunger and
cold, they were induced to insert these articles. But it is
expressly understood and agreed, that the fourth, fifth and
sixth articles, or either of them, may be rejected by the
President and Senate, without affecting the validity of the
other articles of the treaty.06
For the Anishinabe, the continuing right to hunt, fish, and gather
on all of the 1825-Treaty territory was a question of survival,
according to the 1826 U.S. treaty negotiators, themselves.0 '
1834 Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse
Another relatively contemporary indication of the importance
with which Congress treated treaty rights to wild game, such as
those guaranteed in the 1825 Treaty, can be seen in the 1834 Act
to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, which
imposed a $500 fine for non-Native hunting and fishing within the
limits of any tribe with whom the United States has existing
treaties°8--an enormous sum for the time-and permitted military
force to be used to expel non-Indians from "Indian country. 0 9
Sec. 8.
105. Id. at art. V.
106. Id. at art. VII.
107. Id.
108. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to
Preserve Peace on the Frontiers, U.S.-Tribal Nation, June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729,
730 [hereinafter Act of June 30, 1834] (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177




And be it further enacted, That if any person, other than an
Indian, shall, within the limits of any tribe with whom the
United States shall have existing treaties, hunt, or trap, or
take and destroy, any peltries or game, except for subsistence
in the Indian country, such person shall forfeit the sum of five
hundred dollars, and forfeit all the traps, guns, and
ammunition in his possession, used or procured to be used for
that purpose, and peltries so taken.110
Sec. 10.
And be it further enacted, That the superintendent of Indian
affairs, and Indian agents and sub-agents, shall have
authority to remove from the Indian country all persons found
therein contrary to law; and the President of the United States
is authorized to direct the military force to be employed in
such removal."'
In context, this would have included all of the 1825 and 1826
Treaty territory, or all of Northern Minnesota north of Dakota
territory, roughly north of Interstate 94. Thus, as of 1837, the
Anishinabe had treaty-guaranteed rights to control hunting,
fishing, and gathering in all of Northern Minnesota, whether by
members of other Indian tribes or by non-Indians. In fact, all of
Northern Minnesota was unceded, sovereign Anishinabe territory
as guaranteed by U.S. Treaty up to 1854. The definition of "Indian
County" described in the 1834 Act was:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi,
and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the
territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States
east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which
the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of
this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.
This definition would apply to all of Minnesota in 1834 because
the first land cession treaty did not occur until 1837 when the
Mille Lacs Treaty was signed. 3 Moreover, the 1825 and 1826
Treaties had memorialized the usufructuary rights associated
with inchoate "Indian title" nearly a decade earlier and
guaranteed their continued existence in a treaty, ratified by the
government of the United States.1
110. Id. § 8.
111. Id. § 10.
112. Id. § 1.
113. Treaty with the Chippewas, U.S.-Tribal Nation, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536
[hereinafter Treaty of 1837].
114. See 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98, at 291 ("The Chippewa tribe
grant to the government of the United States the right to search for, and carry
away, any metals or minerals from any part of their country. But this grant is not
to affect the title of the land, nor the existing jurisdiction over it."); 1825 Treaty of
Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 275 ("[T]he Chiefs of all the tribes have
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The First Minnesota Land Cession Treaty in the 1837
National Context
During the 1830s, the United States' relationships with
Indian nations were contradictory as reflected in Supreme Court
decisions and shifting national policies. The statement of high
purpose that described U.S. policy toward native peoples and
nations in Article III of the Northwest Ordinance-"[G]ood
faith.., towards the Indians; their.., property shall never be
taken from them without their consent; and, in their property,
rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or
disturbed... ,,11' took on a much different character as post-
independence westward expansion... required differing
relationships with Indian people occupying land needed for
agricultural development in the "plantation South" such as the
Cherokee;117 and those needed for defense from potentially hostile
European powers on the northern border with Canada which U.S.
treaty negotiators plainly stated motivated the 1825 "Sovereignty"
Treaty between the United States and the Dakota and Ojibwe
nations, some of whom had allied with the British only a decade
earlier:
Article 10.
All the tribes aforesaid acknowledge the general controlling
power of the United States, and disclaim all dependence upon,
and connection with, any other power. And the United States
agree to, and recognize, the preceding boundaries, subject to
the limitations and restrictions before provided.
On one hand, prior to the Milles Lacs opinion, as early as
1823 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the title held by Indians
expressed a determination, cheerfully to allow a reciprocal right of hunting on the
lands of one another, permission being first asked and obtained, as before provided
for.").
115. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 37, at 52.
116. Article V of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville applied in the territory occupied
by the Anishinabe, which includes what is now Minnesota. It provided:
The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly to enjoy
them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please,
without any molestation from the United States ... the United States will
protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands
against all citizens of the United States, and against all other white
persons ... [T]he said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be
under the protection of the said United States and no other power whatever.
Treaty of Greenville, supra note 76, at 52 (emphasis added).
117. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
118. 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at art. X.
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pursuant to treaties to be something "lesser than" common law fee
simple and not a property interest in Johnson v. M'Intosh,119 and
as noted by the majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State
v. Keezer:
[A]lthough fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign first the
discovering European nation and later the original States and
the United States a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was
nevertheless recognized ... called Indian title ... recognized
to be only a right of occupancy ... The Federal Government
took early steps to deal with the Indians through treaty, the
principle [sic] purpose often being to recognize and guarantee
the rights of Indians to specified areas of land.
And, in 1831 the Supreme Court held that U.S. treaties with
Indian tribes did not give the tribes the status of an "independent
nation" for purposes of original Supreme Court jurisdiction in
• 121
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.
However, on the other hand, the Court did confirm that the
federal courts were open to Indian treaty claims against states and
held in Worcester v. Georgia that Indian treaty entities, such as
the Cherokee nation, did constitute a "distinct community" with
self-government "in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force."122 Thus, the Court established that only the United States
government, and not individual states, had authority in Indian
affairs. This also meant that explicit congressional direction that
Indian removal be "voluntary" in the Indian Removal Act of
1830,123 required President Andrew Jackson and his successor
Martin Van Buren, justified the use of military force to clear the
Choctaw and Cherokee nations from prime southern plantation
land in a decade-long "Trail of Tears" to Oklahoma by claiming
119. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 603 (1823) ("It has never been contended,
that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been
questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title,
charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that
right.").
120. State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. 1980) (citing Oneida Indian
Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,667 (1974)) (emphasis added).
121. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 27 (1831) ("But in no sense can they
be deemed a foreign state, under the judiciary article.").
122. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).
123. See Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, 411-12 (1830) ("That it shall
and may be lawful for the President of the United States to cause so much of any
territory belonging to the United States ... and to which the Indian title has been
extinguished ... to be divided into a suitable number of districts, for the reception
of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange the lands where they
now reside, and remove there ....").
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authority under dubious, if not fraudulent, post-1830 "voluntary
removal" treaties.
124
With respect to Supreme Court decisions supportive of
sovereignty and the primacy of federally guaranteed treaty rights
over state law, Jackson is reported to have responded, "John
Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it!
'125
Although the accuracy of this quote is disputed, there is no dispute
that it reflected Jackson's own sentiments, or that he engineered
an apparently fraudulent removal treaty with a rump group of
Cherokee, which Van Buren used to justify military expulsion of
the Cherokee from deep south agricultural lands just as the
plantation slave-economy was beginning to boom in the
Mississippi delta.1 2 ' The Cherokee removal treaty of 1835 was
widely criticized as a manipulation when it was put before the
Senate, and was ratified by the margin of a single vote. 7
The Indian Removal Act of 1830 would prove important in
the majority opinion in Mille Lacs regarding the legality of
President Zachary Taylor's 1850 Executive Order, which could not
rely on pre-1850 voluntary treaties of removal with the
Chippewa.12 8 Further, in the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act, Congress identified much of the territory west of the
Mississippi, including Minnesota, as "Indian Country," requiring
passports for entry by non-Indians subject to a fine of $1,000, in
addition to prohibiting hunting and trapping, and even marking of
129trees.
124. See Treaty of New Echota, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 488;
Treaty of Pontotoc Creek, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Oct. 20, 1832, 7 Stat. 381; Treaty of
Payne's Landing, U.S.-Tribal Nation, May 9, 1832, 7 Stat. 368; Treaty of Cusseta,
U.S.-Tribal Nation, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366; Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek,
U.S.-Tribal Nation, Sept. 30, 1830, 7 Stat. 333.
125. PAUL F. BOLLER, JR. & JOHN GEORGE, THEY NEVER SAID IT: A BOOK OF
FAKE QUOTES, MISQUOTES, & MISLEADING ATTRIBUTIONS 53 (1989). Jackson
actually wrote in a letter to John Coffee, "[T]he decision of the Supreme Court has
fell still born, and they find that they cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its
mandate," meaning the Court's opinion was moot because, not being a legislative
body, it had no power to enforce its edict. Id.
126. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 124, at 479 ("The Cherokee nation hereby
cede relinquish and convey to the United States all the lands owned claimed or
possessed by them east of the Mississippi River .... ").
127. See Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a
Congressional Delegate, 15 PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 107 (2005).
128. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 189 (1999) ("In this Court, no party challenges
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Removal Act did not authorize the
President's removal order.").
129. Act of June 30, 1834, supra note 108, at §§ 6, 8.
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These were the circumstances in the rest of Minnesota when
the first land cession treaty with the United States was negotiated
in 1837.130 The Treaty did not abrogate, and specifically retained
the usufructuary property rights of the Chippewa that ran with
the land area described in the Treaty.131 The Treaty did not
terminate the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in the
Treaty territory112 or the usufructuary rights guaranteed in the
rest of Minnesota in the Treaties of 1825 and 182613 that
remained outside the 1837 cession area. The continuing validity
of those usufructuary rights, after cession of the 1837 Treaty
territory to the United States into the modern era, was actually at
issue before the Court sub silentio.
II. "RE-DISCOVERY" OF TREATY-GUARANTEED
USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY: MINNESOTA V. MILLE
LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS
[T]he United States guaranteed to the Indians certain
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land ....
[W]e conclude that the Chippewa retain the usufructuary
rights guaranteed to them under the 1837 Treaty.
- Justice Sandra Day O'Connor14
Within this historical context, the first land cession treaty
with the Anishinabe was negotiated at Fort Snelling near where
the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport is today, with representatives of
nearly all of the widespread Anishinabe bands in attendance in
1837 To secure Anishinabe "consent," United States treaty
negotiators took the approach of severing formal title to land3
130. Treaty of 1837, supra note 113, at 536-38.
131. Id. at 537 ("The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice,
upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is
guarantied [sic] to the Indians, during the pleasure of the President of the United
States.").
132. For a discussion of the distinction between congressional termination of
other aspects of "title" as distinct from "usufructuary property rights" which have
been specifically segregated from other aspects of fee simple title, see Menominee
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
133. See 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98, at 291; 1825 Treaty of
Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 275.
134. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 175-76 (1999).
135. Treaty of 1837, supra note 113, at 536 (regarding location considered
Wisconsin territory at the time).
136. See id. at 536-37; see also Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 176 ("The Chippewa
agreed to sell the land to the United States, but they insisted on preserving their
right to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory.").
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from the continued use of the land for traditional means of
survival,137 thus guaranteeing usufructuary rights to the use of the
land, separate from transfer of title to the land to the United
States: "The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild
rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the
territory ceded, is guarantied [sic] to the Indians, during the
pleasure of the President of the United States." '138 The majority
and dissent in the Mille Lacs case agreed that this clause of the
1837 Treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights, retained by
the Anishinabe, which did not pass with title to the United
States. 9
This is the "unanimous usufructuary rights" opinion that
provides a property rights/due process analysis in a treaty context
that simply was not acknowledged in any previous judicial
opinions. The Anishinabe hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
in the rest of what is now Minnesota were not diminished on un-
ceded territory that was outside the 1837 Treaty boundary but
were guaranteed by the 1795, 1825, and 1826 Treaties14' even
though not specifically referenced in the 1837 Treaty or mentioned
in the Mille Lacs opinion itself. But, all parties to the 1837
Treaty, and to the Mille Lacs opinion conceded that the 1837
Treaty specifically reserved the treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
rights in the ceded territory "during the pleasure of the President
of the United States. 41
In opposition to those usufructuary rights surviving to the
present, Minnesota argued three major points in opposition to the
usufructuary property rights plainly guaranteed in the 1837
Treaty. First, that President Zachary Taylor issued an 1850
Executive Order that revoked usufructuary rights and ordered the
removal of the Anishinabe to un-ceded Minnesota territory (where,
137. The concept of usufructuary rights, or use rights retained after formal
transfer of title, is discussed in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 175-76. See also
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that
Menominee tribe's hunting and fishing rights granted by the Wolf River Treaty of
1854 between the tribe and United States survived the Termination Act of 1954).
138. Treaty of 1837, supra note 113.
139. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200 ("To summarize, the historical record provides
no support for the theory that the second sentence of Article 1 was designed to
abrogate the usufructuary privileges guaranteed under the 1837 Treaty .. "); id.
at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Additionally, the United States granted the
Chippewa a quite limited 'privilege' to hunt and fish, 'guarantied [sic] ... during
the pleasure of the President."').
140. See 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98, at 291; 1825 Treaty of
Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 275; Treaty of Greenville, supra note 76, at 52.
141. Treaty of 1837, supra note 113.
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ironically, the 1795, 1825, and 1826 Treaties guaranteed the
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights of the Anishinabe) with
which none of the parties to the litigation apparently disagreed,
thus acknowledging these property rights were fully intact
according to the U.S. no later than 1850, even according to the
dissent in the Milles Lacs opinion.142 Second, the broad language
of the 1855 Treaty appeared to abrogate all Anishinabe property
claims of any kind, anywhere in Minnesota territory. 14  Third,
Minnesota's 1858 entry into the Union abrogated pre-existing
treaties that were inconsistent with state sovereignty over wildlife
regulation, although the Supreme Court's previous cases appear to
have rejected similar arguments in the late 19 h and 20 h
Centuries.4
A. An 1850 Presidential Order Ratifies Treaty-Guaranteed
Usufructuary Property Rights in All Northern
Minnesota, Outside 1837 Treaty Land-Cession Territory
The 1850 Presidential Order would have sent the Anishinabe
back to that part of Minnesota from which the 1837 Treaty
territory had been ceded, which in 1850 would have been the
remainder of Northern Minnesota where the 1795, 1825, and 1826
Treaties indisputably guaranteed the hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights of the Anishinabe in 1850. President Taylor
apparently did not question the continuing sovereignty of the
Anishinabe in this territory or the usufructuary property rights
that continued to exist by virtue of the earlier treaties. Sub
silentio, the dissent in Mille Lacs accepted President Taylor's
acknowledgement of this fact as well.
The 5-4 majority held that President Zachary Taylor's
Executive Order was ineffective in abrogating the usufructuary
rights guaranteed in the 1837 Treaty for several reasons relating
to an intricate analysis of treaty language and historical context.
146
142. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188-95 (O'Connor, J., majority); id. at 210-17
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 195-202 (O'Connor, J., majority).
144. See id. at 202-08.
145. See Exec. Order No. 5626, Feb. 6, 1850 [hereinafter Taylor Exec. Order]
cited in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 179.
146. For critiques of the Mille Lacs decision, see Kari Krogseng, Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771 (2000); Joshua C.
Quinter, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians: Should the Courts
Interpret Treaty Law to Empower Traditional Native American Tribes to Hatchet
the Environment?, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2000); Jason Ravnsborg, Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians: The Court Goes on Its Own Hunting and
Fishing Expedition, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 312 (2000).
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The Indian Removal Act of 1830 had made the question of
''removal" a national issue of which all in Congress and most
voters would have been aware.147 Parsing the language of the 1837
Treaty and comparing it with other treaties that did specifically
mention "removal" in light of this well-known public controversy
gave the majority its reference point."'
First, the Court noted that the 1837 Treaty provided that the
usufructuary rights were guaranteed "during the pleasure of the
President of the United States,14 9 but did not specifically mention
removal of the Anishinabe from the 1837 territory.5 According to
the majority, there was no agreement in the 1837 Treaty, unlike
other treaties which did provide that the Anishinabe were "subject
to removal therefrom at the pleasure of the President of the United
States." '  Under the 1830 Removal Act, "agreement to be
removed" was a specific requirement of the Act and removal by
Executive Order was not authorized by the 1830 Act.
According to the majority, the historical record reveals that
the initiative for the 1850 Executive Order was a request for
removal from the Minnesota Territorial Legislature in a request to
Congress, rather than the President.1 5 ' The majority considered
this undisputed fact to be recognition by the Territorial
Legislature that the 1837 Treaty itself did not confer removal
power on the President, and that removal would require
congressional action.1 53 Congressional action was not forthcoming,
and on February 6, 1850, President Taylor issued the Executive
Order framed in the following fashion:
The privileges granted temporarily to the Chippewa Indians of
the Mississippi, by the Fifth Article of the Treaty made with
them on the 29th of July 1837, "of hunting, fishing and
gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the
lakes included in the territory ceded" by that treaty to the
147. See Taylor Exec. Order, supra note 145.
148. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188-95.
149. Id. at 177 (quoting Treaty of 1837, supra note 113, at 537).
150. Id. at 189 ("The treaty makes no mention of removal, and there was no
discussion of removal during the Treaty negotiations.").
151. Id. at 177 (quoting 1842 Treaty, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat.
591, 592 [hereinafter Treaty of 1842]) (emphasis added). The Treaty of 1842
provided for removal from territory located in Wisconsin westward to 1826 Treaty-
guaranteed territory in Minnesota, un-ceded by Treaty of 1837. See Treaty of 1842
at 591-92.
152. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 178 ("The Territorial Legislature directed its
resolution to Congress, but it eventually made its way to President Zachary
Taylor.").
153. Id. ("Therefore, any action to remove the Chippewa from the 1837 ceded
lands would require congressional approval.").
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United States; and the right granted to the Chippewa Indians
of the Mississippi and Lake Superior, by the Second Article of
the treaty with them of October 4th, 1842, of hunting on the
territory which they ceded by that treaty, "with the other
usual privileges of occupancy until required to remove by the
President of the United States," are hereby revoked; and all of
the said Indians remaining on the lands ceded as aforesaid,
154
are required to remove to their unceded lands.
Although the larger part of the Order ostensibly addressed
the exercise of usufructuary rights, which President Taylor
apparently conceded remained unceded in the 1825 and 1826
Treaty territory, the historical record established not only that the
Minnesota Territorial Legislature requested removal of the
Anishinabe, the record shows the Minnesota Territorial
Legislature did not request revocation of usufructuary rights.
15 5
Government officials apparently considered the Executive Order
primarily as a removal order 156 with the revocation of the
usufructuary rights on ceded territory a necessary incentive to
encourage removal to un-ceded 1825 and 1826 Treaty territory
north of Dakota territory where the Anishinabe exercise of
usufructuary rights could continue as before.15 '7 By contrast, an
1842 Treaty relating to territory in Wisconsin, referenced in the
Order, directly links exercise of usufructuary rights with
presidential removal.
15 8
But opposition to the attempt at removal was so intense from
both non-Indians, who depended on trade with the Anishinabe,
and the Anishinabe themselves, the policy of presidential removal
was officially abandoned by President Taylor in 1851.159 And, the
Mille Lacs majority also found several examples of official
territorial and federal correspondence indicating that recognition
of Anishinabe usufructuary rights in the 1837 Treaty-ceded
territory continued long after the Executive Order was issued.1 0
154. See Taylor Exec. Order, supra note 145.
155. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 193 ("There is also no evidence that the treaty
privileges themselves-as opposed to the presence of the Indians-caused any
problems necessitating the revocation of those privileges.").
156. See id. ("More importantly, Governor Ramsey and the Minnesota Territorial
Legislature explicitly tied revocation of the treaty privileges to removal.").
157. See id. at 192 ("President Taylor might also have revoked Chippewa
usufructuary rights as a kind of 'incentive program' to encourage the Indians to
remove ...." (emphasis original)).
158. See Treaty of 1842, supra note 151, at 592 ("The Indians stipulate for the
right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the other usual privileges of
occupancy, until required to remove by the President of the United States .... ").
159. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 180-83.
160. Id. at 182 ("In his letter, he noted that '[t]he lands occupied by the
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The majority held, therefore, that revocation of treaty
usufructuary rights was not severable from the unenforceable
removal Order, and could not be enforced independently.1 1
The dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the
Executive Order was not primarily a "removal order" but a
"revocation of usufructuary rights" and, as such, congressional
authorization was not necessary.6 He argues the last part of the
Order that does require removal, is severable from the revocation
order and should be enforced independently.1 3 Chief Justice
Rehnquist concludes this reading of the Order resolves the matter,
and the remaining arguments bolster the main argument based on
this analysis of the Executive Order.1 4
For the Anishinabe, the continuing right to hunt, fish, and
gather on all of the 1825/26 Treaty territory was a question of
survival, confirmed by the observations of the 1826 U.S. treaty
negotiators' report to Congress. From the standpoint of the
Anishinabe, the 1825 and 1826 Treaties guaranteed rights to
hunt, fish, and gather, and both the 1837 Treaty and the 1850
Executive Order confirmed that, outside of the small area ceded in
1837, the guarantees made by the United States in the 1825 and
1826 Treaties had been made even more secure by the 1850
Executive Order.
First, in negotiating in 1837 to cede a portion of the 1825
Treaty sovereign territory, the United States specifically
guaranteed that, although the United States would take "title,"
which had little practical meaning for the Anishinabe, the
Anishinabe retained their ability to use the land both within the
1837-ceded territory and in the rest of the un-ceded 1825/26
timbermen have been surveyed and sold by the United States and the Indians have
no other treaty interests except hunting and fishing."' (quoting Letter from Willis
Gorman, Governor of the Minn. Territory, to George Manypenny, Comm'r of Indian
Affairs (Feb. 16, 1855))(emphasis original)).
161. Id. at 195 ("All we conclude today is that the President's 1850 Executive
Order was insufficient to accomplish this revocation because it was not severable
from the invalid removal order.").
162. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("There is no dispute that the
President had authority under the 1837 Treaty to terminate the treaty
privileges.").
163. Id. at 215-16.
164. Id. at 217-20.
165. 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98, at 292 ("The necessity for the
stipulations in the fourth, fifth and sixth articles of this treaty could be fully
apparent, only from personal observation of the condition, prospects, and wishes of
the Chippewas ... but seeing the extreme poverty of these wretched people, finding
them almost naked and starving, and ascertaining that many perished during the
last winter, from hunger and cold, they were induced to insert these articles.").
[Vol. 33: 143
USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY RIGHTS
Treaty territory.6 Second, even when the "removal" efforts began
in 1850 and ended in 1851, the Executive Order, by its own terms,
attempted to "remove" the Anishinabe to the 1825 Treaty
"sovereign" territory, which had not been ceded in 1837.17 Thus.
the 1850 Order, itself, confirmed Anishinabe sovereignty and the
rights to hunt, fish, and gather in the remainder of the 1825/26
Treaty territory, which was not ceded in 1837, as Anishinabe
"homeland." All of the said Indians remaining on the lands ceded
were required to remove to their un-ceded lands "sovereign"
territory.16
The majority and dissent in the Mille Lacs decision were
unanimous in recognizing that, outside of the 1837 Treaty-ceded
territory which necessarily would be the 1825/26 Treaty territory,
usufructuary property interests recognized by those Treaties were
undiminished by the 1850 Executive Order.9 In fact, the Order
reinforced the continuing sovereignty of the Anishinabe in 1850
and recognized usufructuary rights in the 1825 Treaty territory as
being necessary for the survival of the Anishinabe who were the
subject of proposed expulsion. Whether the Executive Order is
characterized as a "removal order" or a "revocation order severable
from removal" is immaterial with respect to the rest of the 1825/26
Treaty territory. The Anishinabe continued to exercise their
usufructuary rights in the 1825/26 Treaty area outside the 1837
Treaty territory, which the 1850 Executive Order acknowledges as
the Anishinabe's only alternative for survival.
B. Allegedly Silent Abrogation of Pre-existing Treaty-
Guaranteed Property Rights" ' Violates Basic Principles
166. See Treaty of 1837, supra note 113, at 537.
167. See Taylor Exec. Order, supra note 145 ("[A]nd all of the said Indians
remaining on the lands ceded as aforesaid, are required to remove to their unceded
lands.").
168. See id.
169. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 193-95 (1999) (O'Connor, J., majority); id. at 210
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that President Taylor terminated the 1837
Treaty's usufructuary privileges within the ceded territory).
170. Majority and dissent differed as to whether the 1855 Treaty, which
included general language suggesting abrogation of all Chippewa claims in
Minnesota, was sufficient to abrogate prior specific references to retention of
usufructuary property interests in Treaties of 1795, 1825, 1826, 1837, 1847, and
1854. The United States entered into two Treaties in 1847. First, they entered
into a Treaty with the Mississippi and Lake Superior Bands of Anishinabe, to "cede
and sell the land." Treaty with the Chippewas of the Mississippi and Lake
Superior, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Aug. 2, 1847, 9 Stat. 904. Second, they made a
Treaty with the Pillager Band at Leech Lake, for land which "shall be held by the
United States as Indian land, until otherwise ordered by the President." Treaty
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of Treaty Interpretation171 and Due Process 2
The Mille Lacs majority also examined the impact of the 1855
Treaty on the treaty-guaranteed usufructuary rights in the 1837
Treaty territory.7 3  The 1855 Treaty was negotiated in
Washington, D.C. only with the Milles Lacs Band and few if any
other parties to the 1825, 1826, and 1837 Treaties-or the recently
concluded 1854 Treaty, which applied to the "Lake Superior"
Chippewa-and to territory east of the 1855 Treaty territory.7 4
The 1855 Treaty set aside land for reservations within the 1837
and 1855 Treaty territories. However, unlike all previous
treaties, it was completely silent with respect to usufructuary
rights guaranteed in the 1825 and 1826 Treaties, the 1837 Treaty,
or the recently concluded 1854 Treaty:
Chippewa Indians hereby cede, sell, and convey to the United
States all their right, title, and interest in, and to, the lands
now owned and claimed by them, in the Territory of
Minnesota, and included within the following boundaries, viz:
[describing territorial boundaries]. And the said Indians do
further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United
States, any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever
nature the same may be, which they may now have in, and to
any other lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere. 76
The Mille Lacs majority found that there was no discussion of
hunting and fishing or other usufructuary rights in either the
1855 Treaty or in the Treaty Journal. 7 According to the majority,
the absence of any discussion of the usufructuary rights then
with the Pillager Band of Chippewa Indians, U.S.-Chippewa, Aug. 21, 1847, 9 Stat.
908. The 1847 ceded territory was ostensibly for Winnebago and Menominee
Reservations following removal. These events did not occur and neither
Reservation was established. Neither Treaty mentioned abrogation of
usufructuary rights or removal of the Anishinabe. For a discussion of the
circumstances underlying the 1847 Treaty with the Pillager Band, see Pillager
Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 428 F.2d 1274 (1970).
171. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408
(1968) (examining whether an act's silence on the matter of usufructuary rights
"would by implication abolish those hunting and fishing rights").
172. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing
before a recipient of government benefits can be deprived of those benefits,
characterized as "expectation interests" and a form of property).
173. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 195-202.
174. See Treaty of 1855, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165
[hereinafter Treaty of 1855].
175. See id. at art. 2.
176. Id. at art. 1.
177. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 198.
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being exercised by the Anishinabe in 1837-ceded territory, the
1854-ceded territory, or the un-ceded territory to which the 1850
Executive Order attempted to remove the Anishinabe to the 1825
and 1826 Treaty territories, was a telling omission, "because the
United States treaty drafters had the sophistication and
experience to use express language for the abrogation of
[usufructuary] treaty rights." '178
The majority found the absence of any reference to
usufructuary property interests, only a few months after an 1854
Treaty had reserved all such interests held by the Lake Superior
Band to the Mississippi Band, which the 1855 Treaty did not
mention, could not mean an abrogation of those survival rights if
the Court was to interpret the treaty language "liberally in favor
of the Indians," as required by the precedent of the Court.9 The
majority noted that the same U.S. treaty drafters had used explicit
language when revoking Chippewa fishing rights on the St. Mary's
River in Michigan,18 ° and the majority assumed the treaty drafters
would have done the same in the 1855 Treaty if the intention of
the parties was abrogation.
Perhaps more importantly, for purposes of the argument
made by this Article, the majority notes that the debates in the
Senate specifically took note of the pre-existing treaty rights that
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
understood to be the foundation upon which the 1855 Treaty was
grounded. According to the majority,
The Act [of December 19, 1854] is silent with respect to
authorizing agreements to terminate Indian usufructuary
privileges, and this silence was likely not accidental. During
Senate debate on the Act, Senator Sebastian, the chairman of
the Committee on Indian Affairs, stated that the treaties to be
negotiated under the Act would "reserv[e] to them [i.e., the
Chippewa] those rights which were secured by former
treaties."... [W]e cannot agree with the State that the 1855
112Treaty abrogated Chippewa usufructuary rights.
Because the dissent believed that the 1850 Executive Order
was controlling, a complete analysis of the 1855 Treaty was
deemed unnecessary; nevertheless, the dissent offered dicta
178. Id. at 195.
179. Id. at 200.
180. Id. at 195-96 (quoting Treaty with the Chippewa of Sault Ste. Marie, U.S.-
Tribal Nation, Aug. 2, 1855, 11 Stat. 631, 631 ("The said Chippewa Indians
surrender to the United States the right of fishing at the falls of St.
Mary's... secured to them by the treaty of June 16, 1820.").
181. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 195.
182. Id. at 197-200 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1404 (1854)).
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rebutting the majority with respect to the 1855 Treaty by pointing
to language purporting to cede "all" of the territory of Minnesota.183
The Chief Justice argued that the language on the face of the
treaty alone decided the question, "all means all" irrespective of
historical context of prior treaties, the understanding of the
Chairman of the Senate Committee of Indian Affairs, or the
understanding attributed to the Treaty by the Indians.184
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that broad
language in the 1855 Treaty should be read as an abrogation of
the usufructuary property rights specified in the 1837 Treaty,
without the necessity of finding specific treaty language or
congressional intent,185 which would seem to be in contravention of
the Court's precedent."' Such a reading also seems contrary to the
historical record of subsequent conduct of the United States in
relation to this Treaty itself. If the 1855 Treaty did have the
meaning ascribed to it by the Chief Justice, (i.e., that all
usufructuary rights were abrogated) it seems highly unlikely that
the United States would have found it necessary to seek
subsequent land-cession treaties with the Anishinabe after 1855.
However, the United States sought land cessions on at least
seven separate occasions.8 Had the United States Government
183. Id. at 217-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184. Although not cited by the dissent, this is the same position adopted by the
Eighth Circuit in an earlier claim by the Red Lake Band that usufructuary rights
in the 1863 Treaty territory were not abrogated by congressional enactments in
1889 and 1904, which contained language similar to the 1855 Treaty in which the
State of Minnesota prevailed. See United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382
(D. Minn. 1979). The district court looked only to the 1863 Treaty with the Red
Lake Band and to the congressional enactments in question, which did not refer to
retention of usufructuary rights, and concluded that the intent of Congress was to
abrogate those rights along with the cession of title. Id. at 1388. However, the
district court and Eighth Circuit mistakenly considered the rights in question to be
inchoate aboriginal rights, unspecified in any previous treaty. Both the Treaty of
1854 and the 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien give lie to this apparently un-
rebutted assumption by the court. See Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1111; 1825
Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 275.
185. Mille Lacs at 210-13. See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist.,
420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975).
186. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
187. An Act Making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of
the Indian Department and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with various Indian
tribes, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1058, 1077 [hereinafter Statute of
1901] (without mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights); An Act for the Relief
and Civilization of the Chippewa Indians in the State of Minnesota, U.S.-Chippewa
Indians of Minnesota, except the White Earth and Red Lake Reservations, U.S.-
Tribal Nation, Jan. 14, 1889, 25 Stat. 642 [hereinafter Nelson Act of 1889] (ceding
territory between west 1855 Treaty Boundary and 1863 Treaty Boundary without
mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights); Treaty with the Chippewa of the
Mississippi, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Mar. 19, 1867, 16 Stat. 719 [hereinafter Treaty of
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considered that the Anishinabe actually abrogated all "rights and
claims in Minnesota," not one treaty after 1855 would have been
necessary. The dissent also failed to note that Supreme Court
precedent had specifically analyzed the scope of the 1855 Treaty
and had come to much different conclusions than the dissent over
eighty years ago,"' as had the Minnesota Supreme Court.18 9 The
dissent did not provide insight into how this reading would
conform to well-settled canons of Indian treaty interpretation,
which require treaties to be read contextually and "liberally," as
understood by the Indians. 9 ° Moreover, the truncated historical
discussion of the 1855 Treaty, resulting from the dissent's view
that the 1850 Executive Order made further discussion
unnecessary, did not provide a meaningful construction of the
1855 Treaty, to contest other than the majority's view' 1 and the
historical review in the district court opinion. 
19 2
1866 (with Mississippi Band)] (ceding territory at Canadian Border west of 1854
Treaty Border and into Dakota Territory without mention of abrogation of
usufructuary rights); 1864 Modification of 1863 Treaty (with Mississippi, Pillager,
Winnibigoshish Bands), 13 Stat. 861 [hereinafter 1864 Modification of 1863 Treaty
(with Mississippi, Pillager, Winnibigoshish Bands)] (showing no discussion of
abrogation of usufructuary rights); Treaty with the Chippewa Indians, U.S.-Tribal
Nation, Apr. 12, 1864, 13 Stat. 689 [hereinafter 1864 Modification of 1863 Treaty
(with Red Lake and Pembina Bands)] (ruling without mention of abrogation of
usufructuary rights); Treaty with the Chippewa Indians, U.S. Red Lake and
Pembina Bands of Chippewa Indians art. II, U.S.-Tribal Nation, Oct. 2, 1863, 13
Stat. 667 [hereinafter Treaty of 1863 (Red Lake, Pembina Bands)] (ceding territory
on western Minnesota border along the Red River to the Canadian border and into
Dakota Territory without mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights); Treaty of
1863 (with Mississippi, Pillager, Winnibigoshish Bands), U.S.-Tribal Nation, 12
Stat. 1249 [hereinafter Treaty of 1863 (with Mississippi, Pillager, Winnibigoshish
Bands)] (ceding reservations established in the 1855 Treaty without mention of
abrogation of usufructuary rights in the 1855 Treaty territory, or elsewhere in the
1825 Treaty territory).
188. Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422 (1914).
189. See State v. Jackson, 16 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. 1944) (relying on the 1834
Trade and Intercourse with the Indians, as well as Article VII of the 1855 Treaty,
to find that as of 1944, Anishinabe usufructuary rights remained in effect in "Indian
Country," which included reservations, trust territory and "lands wherever situated,
which have been set apart for use and occupancy by Indians, even though not
acquired from them" (quoting United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938)).
190. United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (D. Minn. 1979)
(citing Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970)).
191. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 195-200 (1999).
192. Mille Lacs 11, 952 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Minn. 1997); Mille Lacs III, 861 F.
Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994).
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C. The 1858 Minnesota Statehood Act in Prior Supreme
Court Treaty Litigation
According to the Mille Lacs majority, Minnesota's entry into
the Union did not have any impact on rights established in
treaties entered into by the United States.9 The Supreme Court
has long held that Congress must clearly express intent to
abrogate Indian treaty rights under United States v. Dion."' Such
intent must have been present either in Minnesota's 1858
enabling act, or one of the treaties between the United States and
the Anishinabe, all of which are silent on the matter.9 5 There is
no indication that Senate ratification of the 1837 Treaty
contemplated that the 1837 Treaty, or other treaties prior to 1858,
would terminate at statehood.19
Following Minnesota statehood, the United States undertook
the following treaties and congressional enactments with relation
to the Anishinabe:
Treaty of 1863 (with Mississippi, Pillager, Winnibigoshish
Bands) 9 - Ceding reservations set up in the 1855 Treaty,
with no mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights in the
1855 Treaty territory, or elsewhere in the 1825 Treaty
territory.
Treaty of 1863 (Red Lake, Pembina Bands)'" - Ceding
territory on the western Minnesota border along the Red River
to the Canadian border and into Dakota Territory. No
mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights.
Treaty of 1866 (with Mississippi Band)19 - Ceding territory
at the Canadian Border west of the 1854 Treaty Border and
into Dakota Territory. No mention of abrogation of
usufructuary rights."'
193. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-03.
194. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986) ("We have required that
Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain.").
195. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-03.
196. Id. at 207.
197. Treaty of 1863 (with Mississippi, Pillager, Winnibigoshish Bands), supra
note 187, at 1249.
198. Treaty of 1863 (Red Lake, Pembina Bands), supra note 187, at 689. See
United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (D. Minn. 1979) (finding
without mention of hunting and fishing rights that "the transcript of Ramsey's
negotiations with the Band makes clear that the Indians were promised they could
continue to hunt and fish on the ceded land until it was settled"); see also infra
Appendix II.
199. Treaty of 1866 (with Mississippi Band), supra note 187, at 719.
200. Id. (making no mention of usufructuary rights in the 1866 Treaty, but
transcript of the negotiations does make clear that the Indians were promised
continued hunting and fishing rights on the ceded land). Minnesota, 466 F. Supp.
at 1383.
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1864 Modification of 1863 Treaty (with Red Lake and Pembina
Bands)201 - Red Lake Band refuses to remove, cede or trade
lands. No mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights.2 2
Nelson Act of 1889203 - Ceding territory between west of the
1855 Treaty boundary and the 1863 Treaty boundary. No
mention of abrogation of usufructuary rights.
Statute of 1901205 - No mention of abrogation of usufructuary
201rights. 6
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934207 - No mention of
201
abrogation of usufructuary rights.
209Section 478b-Application of laws and treaties -"Nothing
in the Act of June 18, 1934, shall be construed to abrogate or
impair any rights guaranteed under any existing treaty with
any Indian tribe ... "
Public Law 280, 1953210 - No mention of abrogation of
usufructuary rights.
Although not discussed extensively by the majority, this was
not the first occasion that the Court had to address the effect of
Minnesota's statehood on pre-existing federally-established
limitations on land use in "Indian Country."211 By 1871, Congress
had also made clear that tribes were not considered independent
201. 1864 Modification of 1863 Treaty (with Red Lake and Pembina Bands),
supra note 187, at 689 ("The said Red Lake and Pembina bands of Chippewa
Indians do hereby agree and assent to the provisions of the said treaty, concluded
at the Old Crossing of Red Lake River, as amended by the Senate of the United
States by resolution bearing date the first day of March, in the year eighteen
hundred and sixty-four.").
202. Id.
203. Nelson Act of 1889, supra note 187, at 642.
204. But see Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1383 (1979), affd, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th
Cir. 1980) (stating the Red Lake Band of Chippewa sought declaratory judgment
that its members retained hunting, fishing, trapping, and wild ricing rights in
areas which the Band ceded to the federal government in 1889 and 1904
relinquishing all its right, title, and interest in and to the ceded area meant that the
band also ceded usufructuary rights in the subject areas, in direct contravention of
the construction of the same language by the Supreme Court in the 1855 Treaty in
the Mille Lacs decision).
205. Statute of 1901, supra note 187, at 1077.
206. See Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1384.
207. Indian Reorganization Act, June 18, 1934, 73 Pub. L. 383, 48 Stat. 984.
208. See Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1384 (recognizing that the Act requires
recognition of pre-existing treaty rights).
209. 25 U.S.C. § 478b (1935).
210. In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (1954); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1324 (1954); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1954))
(giving certain states broad criminal jurisdiction within some Indian reservations
to confront the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, the absence
of adequate trial institutions for law enforcement and criminal prosecutions, and
reinforcing civil-regulatory tribal jurisdiction).
211. See Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 426 (1914).
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nations with which treaties would be negotiated; nonetheless,
treaties the United States entered into with tribes before that date
were considered binding without reference to intervening
statehood.212 In 1914, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v.
Gearlds that the terms of the 1855 Treaty213 remained in effect
despite Minnesota statehood.1 4 The Court described the impact of
Minnesota statehood on the terms of the 1855 Treaty:
15
By act of February 26, 1857 ... the inhabitants of a portion of
the territory, including the lands ceded by the Chippewas as
above, were authorized to form a state government and come
into the Union on an equal footing with the original states.
The act contained no condition with reference to the treaty of
1855 or the rights of the Indians to any lands within the
boundaries of the state ... Congress, by act of May 11,
1858... admitted the state "on an equal footing with the
original states in all respects whatever.""1
The Court reviewed all subsequent treaties with the
Anishinabe between 1863 and 1867 that ceded land but did not
mention abrogation of the treaty term (at issue was a liquor ban
established by statute and the 1855 Treaty). 7  The Court also
discussed the January 14, 1889 Nelson Act 18 that authorized the
President to negotiate the complete cession and relinquishment of
their title.21 ' The Court did not question the assumption by all
parties that the terms of the 1855 Treaty were not abrogated in
Treaty territory by Minnesota statehood.2 2 ' The Court did review
212. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988) ("No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe,
or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of
any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to
March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.").
213. See Treaty of 1855, supra note 174.
214. Gearlds, 234 U.S. at 439 ("And we cannot agree with the District Court that
article 7 of the treaty of 1855 was repealed by the Minnesota enabling act, or by the
admission of that state into the Union upon equal terms with other states.").
215. Id. at 426 ("The laws which have been or may be enacted by Congress,
regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, to continue and be in force
within and upon the several reservations provided for herein; and those portions of
said laws which prohibit the introduction, manufacture, use of, and traffic in,
ardent spirits, wines, or other liquors, in the Indian country, shall continue and be
in force, within the entire boundaries of the country herein ceded to the United
States, until otherwise provided by Congress.") (citing Treaty of 1855, supra note
174, at 1169).
216. Id. (quoting MINN. CONST.).
217. Id. at 446.
218. Id. at 442-43 (citing Nelson Act of 1889, supra note 187, at 642).
219. Id. at 443 (noting an anomaly in the territory: "[T]he diminished Red Lake
Reservation is admittedly a strip of land, approximately [fifteen] miles in width,
which never was subject to the treaty of 1855 ....").
220. Id. at 436 (citing Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877); United States v.
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the living conditions and the status of Chippewa living in the 1855
Treaty territory, which confirms that both the Anishinabe and the
Court understood that the usufructuary rights of the Anishinabe
and the ancestors who signed the 1855 Treaty, and earlier treaties
as well, were being exercised in the 1855 Treaty territory well into
the 20 Century:
[W]e prefer to confine our attention to the situation as it
existed in 1910 within the boundaries of the great tract that
was the subject of the cession of 1855 . . . . The majority of
[White Earth and Leech Lake members] these reside upon
lands embraced within the original reservation, and they are
the same Indians, or descendants of the same, that were
parties to the treaties of 1855, 1865, and 1867 .. . . And it is
admitted that for purposes of business, pleasure, hunting,
travel, and other diversions, these Indians traverse parts of
the region comprised in the cession of 1855, outside of the
reservations, and thus visit the towns, villages, and cities in
the territory, including Bemidji. On the other hand it is
admitted that their visits to Bemidji are infrequent, and that
there are no Indian habitations within a range of 20 miles inS 221
any direction from that city.
With respect to the effect of Minnesota statehood on abrogating
the liquor ban imposed in the 1855 Treaty and a pre-existing
federal statute, the Court made clear that the Statehood Act had
no impact at all, but that Congress had the power to act, if it chose
to do so:
On February 17, 1911 ... the President, in a special message,
called attention to the situation in Minnesota, resulting from
the operation of the old Indian treaties under present
conditions; and with respect to the area ceded by the
Chippewas in 1855, he stated: "The records of the Indian
Bureau show that there are within said area, under the
jurisdiction of the superintendents of the White Earth and
Leech Lake Reservations, 7,196 Indians who can amply be
protected by limiting the territory as to which said treaty
provisions shall remain in force and effect to the area within
and contiguous to said reservations, particularly described as
follows: ... I therefore recommend that Congress modify the
article of said treaty quoted above so as to exclude from the
operations of its provisions all of the territory ceded by said
treaty to the United States, except that immediately above
described."
222
According to the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Gearlds in 1914:
"That Congress has not yet acted upon this recommendation is
Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876)).
221. Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 442-43 (1914).
222. Id. at 447.
20151
Law and Inequality
evidence that the problem is not so entirely obvious of solution
that it can be judicially declared to be beyond the range of
legislative discretion." '223
With respect to abrogation of hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights established in treaties before Statehood, this would seem to
be the case as well. As the Supreme Court later held in
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, even statutory
language that unequivocally terminates a reservation does not
abrogate usufructuary hunting and fishing property rights. 4
Treaty language that cedes title, without mentioning pre-existing
usufructuary rights guaranteed in prior treaties for several
decades, cannot amount to silent abrogation of those rights
according to the Supreme Court's treatment of abrogation
usufructuary property rights in Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States."' Long before the treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
property analysis in the Mille Lacs opinion, the Court stated, "We
decline to construe the Termination Act as a backhanded way of
abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these Indians ... 'the
intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly
imputed to the Congress."'"2
D. The Treaty of 1854, Lac Courte Oreilles v. Voigt (LCO I-
VIII) and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
The majority opinion in Mille Lacs referred to the LCO
litigation 7 construing the 1854 Treaty with the Anishinabe, which
was the subject of lengthy litigation in the Seventh Circuit,
resulted in first recognition usufructuary rights in territory ceded
by the 1854 Treaty in Wisconsin and Minnesota. 8 Like the 1837
Treaty at issue in Minnesota v. the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa,
the 1854 Treaty specifically mentioned the retention of
usufructuary rights within the ceded territory.9 While the focus
of the litigation was the impact of the Treaty on off-reservation
223. Id.
224. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1968)
("'Nothing in this section... shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community of any right privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control,
licensing, or regulation thereof.' (Emphasis added.)") (citing Public Law 280, 67
Stat. 588, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1954)).
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S, 138, 160 (1934)).
227. See supra note 55.
228. Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1111.
229. Id.; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 199 (1999).
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usufructuary rights in Wisconsin, by 1988 both Wisconsin and
Minnesota negotiated agreements with Anishinabe Bands within
the 1854 Treaty territory that recognized the continuing validity of
Anishinabe treaty rights. The discussion of the 1854 Treaty by the
Mille Lacs majority further clarifies the conditions in which the
1855 Treaty was negotiated and the status of Anishinabe hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights in un-ceded 1825 Treaty territory as
of 1855.230
In 1854, the House of Representatives began debating a bill
"to provide for the extinguishment of the title" in the Territories of
Minnesota and Wisconsin, 231 but not "removing" the Anishinabe or
eliminating the hunting, fishing, and gathering subsistence
activities for their livelihood.2 2  But Congress did provide for
reservations within the ceded territory, a provision that eventually
found its way into the 1855 Treaty. 23 The Commissioner for
Indian Affairs instructed his agent to acquire "all the country" the
Anishinabe claimed in Minnesota and Wisconsin in August 1854,
which resulted in the 1854 Treaty being negotiated in the fall of
that year.3 4  However, the authorizing legislation for land
acquisition treaties with the Anishinabe was not passed until
December 1854, when Congress must already have been aware of
the terms of the already-negotiated 1854 Treaty.
235
The Lake Superior Band retained usufructuary rights in the
ceded territory in Minnesota's "arrowhead" and the Mississippi
Band retained sovereignty west of the 1854 Treaty boundary, until
the 1855 Treaty ceded part of the western sovereign 1825 and
1826 Treaty territory.26  The 1855 Treaty was negotiated in
Washington D.C. between February 12 and 22 by the
Commissioner for Indian Affairs, George Manypenny, and treaty
negotiators who were also well aware of the 1854 Treaty after the
authorizing legislation was passed in December 1854.27 The Mille
Lacs majority opinion confirms the conclusion that the authorizing
legislation, the 1855 Treaty and the Treaty Journal, all focused on
land acquisition, not the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in
which the Anishinabe were most interested and had insisted on
230. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196-200.
231. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1032 (1854).
232. Id.
233. Treaty of 1855, supra note 174, at 1166.
234. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 183.
235. Id. at 184.
236. Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1077.
237. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 197.
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retaining in the treaties of 1837 and 1854.238 The majority also
pointed out that the signatories to the 1854 Treaty included most
of the bands that resided in the 1837 Treaty territory, but only the
Mille Lacs Band was party to the 1855 Treaty, and:
If the United States had intended to abrogate Chippewa
usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty, it almost certainly
would have included a provision to that effect in the 1854
Treaty, yet that Treaty contains no such provision. To the
contrary, it expressly secures new usufructuary rights to the
signatory bands on the newly ceded territory. 9
In the sense that the Anishinabe possessed rights to hunt,
fish, and gather on un-ceded territory over which they had claims
of ownership, the "treaty right" to continued use of the land after
ownership claims had been ceded did "secure new usufructuary
rights." However, the 1854 Treaty also specifically reserved for
the Mississippi Band the undiminished usufructuary rights that
had been previously recognized in earlier treaties on un-ceded
territory west of the 1854 Treaty boundary as well.240 The 1795,
1825, and 1826 Treaties make clear that the Anishinabe had more
than "Indian title" claims to un-ceded 1825/26 Treaty territory,
over which the United States recognized the Anishinabe retained
sovereignty and the unquestioned right to hunt, fish, and gather
by treaties approved by Congress. 24'1 The 1854 Treaty is careful to
differentiate the un-ceded 1825/26 Treaty territory, with its
treaty-guaranteed usufructuary rights, from the area ceded by the
Lake Superior Band to the east of the 1854 Treaty boundary:
The Chippewas of the Mississippi hereby assent and agree to
the foregoing cession, and consent that the whole amount of
consideration money for the country ceded above, shall be paid
to the Chippewas of Lake Superior, and in consideration
thereof the Chippewas of Lake Superior hereby relinquish to
the Chippewas of the Mississippi, all their interest in and
claim to the lands heretofore owned by them in common, lying
west of the above boundary line.242
Further, the terms of the 1854 Treaty specifically refer to the
continuation of pre-existing treaty rights to be exercised by both
the Lake Superior and Mississippi Chippewa, which can
meaningfully refer to Minnesota only with respect to the Treaties
of 1837, 1826, and 1825: "It is agreed between the Chippewas of
238. Id. at 183-85.
239. Id. at 199 (emphasis original).
240. See Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1111.
241. See 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82; Treaty of Greenville,
supra note 76.
242. Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1109.
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Lake Superior and the Chippewas of the Mississippi, that the
former shall be entitled to two thirds, and the latter to one third,
of all benefits to be derived from the former treaties existing prior
to the year 1847,,243 This means that the historical record and
treaty construction found in the LCOIVoight cases not only
establishes the continuing validity of the Lake Superior Chippewa
usufructuary property rights in the 1854-ceded territory, but the
1854 Treaty also guarantees usufructuary property rights to the
Mississippi Chippewa west of the 1854 Treaty boundary as well.
244
As of 1854, the United States had guaranteed the right of the
Anishinabe to hunt, fish, and gather on the land west of the 1854
Treaty boundary in the 1795 Treaty of Greenville, the 1825 Treaty
of Prairie du Chien, the 1826 Treaty of Lake Superior, the 1837
Treaty-ceded territory, and the territory to which the 1850
Executive Order would have removed the Anishinabe.t
Congressional passage of the treaty negotiation authorizing
legislation, after the 1854 Treaty terms were drawn in the fall of
1854, is strong evidence that Congress understood before the
authorizing legislation was passed that new usufructuary rights
were guaranteed in 1854-ceded territory and undiminished
sovereignty, including usufructuary rights, was guaranteed to the
Mississippi Band in the 1825 Treaty territory west of the 1854
Treaty boundary.4  Seen in this light, the 1854 Treaty not only
supports the majority's reading of the broad language in the 1855
Treaty not having an impact regarding 1837 Treaty usufructuary
rights, but also demonstrates that: (a) rights specified in the 1825
Treaty were ratified by the 1854 Treaty;247 (b) the rights specified
in the 1825/26, 1837, and 1854 Treaties were further ratified by
the congressional authorization of the 1854 Treaty, in retrospect;
and, (c) the passage of the authorizing legislation, after
usufructuary property rights in the 1825/26 "sovereign" territory
had been reinforced in the 1854 Treaty-ceded territory and ratified
in the 1854 Treaty un-ceded territory, authorizing only purchase
of 1854 ceded territory. Such legislation does not suggest
congressional intent to abrogate treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
rights.
The 1854 Treaty guarantee of undiminished claims to the
Mississippi Band is powerful evidence that, as of January 1, 1855,
243. Id. at art. 8.
244. Id.
245. See infra Appendix I.
246. Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1111.
247. Id. at art. 11.
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the Anishinabe retained treaty-guaranteed hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights in: (a) the 1837-ceded territory; (b) the 1854-ceded
territory; and (c) the rest of the un-ceded 1825/26 Treaty territory,
which was not abrogated by the 1854 Treaty, the December 1854
congressional treaty authorization legislation, the February 1855
Treaty, or the subsequent treaty ratification by the Senate.
III. MINNESOTA TREATY PRECEDENT IN RETROSPECT:
MILLE LACS USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY ANALYSIS,
AS APPLIED
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the first modern
Anishinabe treaty-rights litigation began being decided by state
and federal courts without a full record of all of the treaties
bearing on treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights.24' Nor
could previous judicial opinions benefit from the more complete
understanding of the usufructuary property analysis provided by
the Mille Lacs opinion regarding the property interests created by
the language chosen by U.S. treaty negotiators to secure "title" to
treaty territory. By applying the Mille Lacs analysis
retrospectively to selected examples of Minnesota "treaty
precedent," it is possible to gauge how the Mille Lacs opinion is
likely to impact long-accepted precedent. Three examples selected
for illustration are:
(a) Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 1 in
which the district court held that the 1889 Nelson Act's "all
our right, title and interest" language did not abrogate
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on public lands on the
Leech Lake Reservation;
(b) United States v. Minnesota, in which the Minnesota
District Court and the Eighth Circuit 253 held that cession of
"all ... title and interest" in the 1889 Nelson Act and a 1904
congressional enactment did abrogate the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa usufructuary property rights on 3.2 million acres
of non-reservation ceded territory, despite verbal promises by
248. See infra Appendix I.
249. See United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (D. Minn. 1979);
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1003-04 (D.
Minn. 1971); State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Minn. 1980).
250. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 184 (1999).
251. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1003-06.
252. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1383-84.




Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey that the Red Lake
Band could hunt and fish on ceded territory "until it was
settled";25 '4 and
(c) State v. Keezer,5 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
overturned a three-judge panel, which held hunting, fishing,
and gathering rights, guaranteed in the 1795 and 1825
Treaties, prohibited Minnesota from regulating Anishinabe
wild ricing on public land.
Only the first of the three examples is likely be decided similarly
under the treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in the Mille Lacs opinion.
A. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst
The Leech Lake Band fought against state enforcement of
state hunting and fishing regulations as applied to Band members
on the Reservation. The court limited its examination of treaty
rights to the Leech Lake Reservation and started with the premise
that, at the time of the passage of the Nelson Act in 1889, the
Indians possessed unrestricted hunting and fishing rights as
aboriginal rights that were established by reservation treaties in
1855, 1864, and 1867.25' The State agreed that the Leech Lake
Indians possessed the claimed fishing and hunting rights as the
Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v. Jackson.2 5 7 The State
also agreed that Congress alone has the power over treaty rights
with Indians, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.2 5 ' The State of
Minnesota argued that the Leech Lake Band ceded all hunting
and fishing rights in the 1889 Nelson Act: "[We] do hereby grant,
cede and relinquish and convey to the United States, for the
purposes and upon the terms stated in said (Nelson) Act, all our
right, title and interest in and to the lands reserved and set
apart. 2 5'  However, when taken in context and understood by the
Indians who had exercised such rights on the reservation for
generations, the Court held this language insufficient to abrogate
either the Leech Lake Reservation or the hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights on the Reservation, because federal responsibility
in the United States trust relationship with Indians is not
254. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1383-84.
255. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 715.
256. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1004.
257. Id. at 1003-04; State v. Jackson, 16 N.W.2d 752, 753 (Minn. 1944).
258. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1003. See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 565 (1903).
259. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1003.
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dependent solely upon the passing of legal land title and, as the
court made clear in Milles Lacs, the usufructuary property rights
are not so easily abrogated."' As stated in Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians v. Herbst:
It is apparent in light of events before and after the passage of
the Nelson Act that its purpose was not to terminate the
reservation or end federal responsibility for the Indian...
. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is the
termination of federal responsibility and not the passing of
legal land title within an area which determines whether a
reservation exists in the eyes of the law .... That the Nelson
Act was not intended to terminate federal responsibility for
the Indians . . . . If it was the intention of Congress to
disestablish the Leech Lake Reservation, the Congress knew
how to say so in clear language .... It spoke with the
necessary clarity also in the case of the Menominee Indians of
Wisconsin. There the Congress effected its intention to
terminate the reservation by express language .... Despite
this unequivocal language in Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States... the United States Supreme Court held that
while the language was effective to terminate the reservation,
it still did not abrogate Indian fishing and hunting rights. It
said: "We decline to construe the Termination Act as a
backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights
of those Indians. The intention to abrogate or modify a treaty
is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress."2 1
Although written some thirty years before Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, and not based on the treaty-
guaranteed usufructuary property analysis adopted in that case,
the respect of Indian property rights reflected in the Herbst
decision appears quite modern and would certainly withstand
scrutiny by either the Mille Lacs majority or the dissent, as
expressing the reasoning underlying the usufructuary property
analysis adopted by the Court.
B. United States v. Minnesota
In United States v. Minnesota, the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa were represented by the federal government in seeking
a declaratory judgment that members of its Band retain hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights in 3.2 million acres ceded in the
congressional enactments of 1889 and 1904, which did not mention
cession of hunting, fishing, and gathering usufructuary property
260. Id. at 1005; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 193-95 (1999).
261. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1005 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
262. United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (1979).
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rights.23 These enactments duplicated the written terms of the
1863 Treaty that ceded ten million acres to the United States,
which also failed to mention hunting, fishing, and gathering,24 but
which were orally promised by former Minnesota Governor
Alexander Ramsey, according to the 1863 Treaty minutes, until it
was settled. The district court found that, because the 1889 and
1904 congressional enactments addressed only cession of the 3.2
million acres that remained with the Red Lake Band after ten
million acres had been ceded, the misrepresentation of Governor
Ramsey was not relevant to determining what the Indians
understood about the 1889 and 1904 enactments, which stated the
Red Lake Band agreed to surrender "[aill its right, title, and
interest.
2 1
The court did concede that there is no record that Congress
intended either abrogation or retention of hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights, so the decision turned largely on whether the
Anishinabe had "treaty-guaranteed" rights before 1863 or not.
2 17
The court also conceded that treaties and agreements must be
interpreted as the Indians understood them and "[clongressional
intent to abrogate Indian property rights must be clear from the
face of the Act or surrounding circumstances and, that doubtful
expressions in the Act must be resolved in favor of the Indians.
' '2 8
Without citing Leech Lake v. Herbst or its analysis of the Nelson
Act at all, the court concluded "Indian title" was at issue in the
Red Lake claim, without reference to treaties before 1863:
[T]he [1863] cession was to "operate as complete
extinguishment of Indian title"... [i]f the cessions
extinguished Indian title to the ceded areas, they also would
have the effect of abrogating any aboriginal hunting, fishing,
trapping, or wild ricing rights. These rights are mere
incidents of Indian title, not rights separate from Indian title,
and consequently if Indian title is extinguished so also would
these aboriginal rights be extinguished.
The court concluded that, at least with respect to the 3.2
million acres at issue, the Red Lake Band could claim only
hunting and fishing rights that ran with the land27" and were not
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1383, 1387.
266. Id. at 1388.
267. Id. at 1385-86.
268. Id. at 1384-85.
269. Id. at 1385.
270. Id. at 1383, 1388.
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"separate from Indian title." '271 This holding would be completely
contrary to Milles Lacs' usufructuary property rights analysis
today because the court ignored the usufructuary property
interests created by United States treaty negotiators in the
language of the 1825, 1826, and 1854 Treaties, which refer to the
272
same territory as the 1863 Treaty-ceded territory.
The U.S. Attorney representing the Band apparently made
some effort to use Governor Ramsey's oral representation that the
Anishinabe could continue to hunt and fish on the ten million
acres to demonstrate the Indian understanding of the 1889 and
1904 enactments,2 3 but failed to directly challenge the abrogation
of 1863 Treaty usufructuary rights promised by the treaty
274
negotiators in the ten million acres, or make use of the terms of
1795, 1825, 1826, or 1854 Treaties, by which the United States
had converted "Indian title" to treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
property rights long before 1863 But the United States argued,
against its own interests, what usufructuary property interests
the Chippewa and U.S. treaty negotiators had previously agreed
upon before the land cession treaties began in 1837.2 The U.S.
Attorney did not correct the trial court's incorrect assumption that
the Red Lake Band lacked treaty-guaranteed property interests,
nor did the U.S. Attorney seek to correct this error before the
Eighth Circuit on appeal by pointing out the usufructuary
property rights guaranteed in the Treaties prior to 1837.77
But, as described earlier in this Article, these usufructuary
property rights were guaranteed by treaty in: (a) the sovereign
territory governed by the 1787 Northwest Ordinance; (b) all of the
sovereign 1795 Treaty territory, which would eventually become
Minnesota; (c) the sovereign 1825 Treaty territory in Minnesota
north of sovereign Dakota territory in southern Minnesota; (d) the
1826 Treaty territory in which "title" and "jurisdiction" were
guaranteed to the Anishinabe in the northern half of Minnesota;
271. See Treaty of Old Crossing, supra note 67, at 1249; Treaty of 1854, supra
note 18, at 1111; 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac, supra note 98, at 290; 1825 Treaty of
Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 272.
272. See infra Appendices I and II.
273. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1386-87.
274. Id.
275. See Treaty of 1854, supra note 18, at 1111; 1826 Treaty of Fond du Lac,
supra note 98, at 290; 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 272;
Treaty of Greenville, supra note 76, at 49.
276. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1386-87.




(e) the 1837 Treaty that ceded territory to the United States,
which specifically retained usufructuary rights in that territory; (f)
the territory outside the 1837 Treaty territory to which the
Anishinabe were to have been removed by the 1850 Executive
Order (i.e., the un-ceded 1825/26 Treaty territory encompassing
the rest of Minnesota); (g) the 1854 Treaty-ceded territory in the
"arrowhead," in which usufructuary rights were specifically
retained; and (h) the territory west of the 1854 Treaty boundary, in
which the Mississippi Band were guaranteed undiminished rights
(i.e., the un-ceded 1825/26 Treaty territory encompassing the rest
of Minnesota).278
Thus, as of February 1855, the United States had guaranteed
to the Anishinabe the right to hunt, fish, and gather in every part
of Minnesota 27 by treaty, on at least six separate occasions over a
period of sixty years, including a Presidential Executive Order.
80
And, 1863 treaty negotiator, Minnesota Governor Alexander
Ramsey, did tell the Indians that the hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights were guaranteed in the ten million acres ceded in
the 1863 Treaty for an indefinite period after transfer of title to
the United States.2 1 However, neither the district court, nor the
Eighth Circuit, nor plaintiffs counsel looked further into treaty
history than to determine whether the territory ceded in 1863 had
212previous Treaty status or not.
Furthermore, the language in the two congressional
enactments at issue is very similar to that in the 1855 Treaty,
which the Mille Lacs opinion held did not abrogate pre-existing
usufructuary rights established in earlier treaties. 23 According to
the Court, the language in these enactments was "precisely suited"
for eliminating "Indian title" and conveying to the government
"the Band's interest in the ceded lands, 8 4 irrespective of the
misrepresentation in the 1863 Treaty negotiations: "[Any and all
right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be,
278. See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 37, at art. 3; see also Treaty of
1854, supra note 18, at 1111; Treaty of 1837, supra note 113, at 537; 1826 Treaty of
Fond du Lac, supra note 98; 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82, at 272;
Treaty of Greenville, supra note 76, at 49.
279. For a pictorial representation of the Treaty-ceded territories, see infra
Appendices I and II.
280. See Taylor Exec. Order, supra note 145.
281. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1383.
282. Red Lake Band, 614 F.2d at 1161.
283. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 208 (1999) (holding that the Chippewa
usufructuary rights are guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty).
284. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. at 1385.
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which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the
Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere.""28 However, this is precisely
the language that the majority rejected in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians as inadequate to abrogate specific
reservation of usufructuary rights in the 1837 Treaty."' Moreover,
when the misrepresentation by Ramsey in the 1863 Treaty
negotiations is placed in the context of the preceding sixty years of
explicit guarantees by the United States that Anishinabe had the
right to hunt, fish, and gather on the land upon which they had
depended for survival for centuries," 7 the argument that the
Indians understood the United States was silently abrogating
these rights is much more difficult to sustain following the
usufructuary property rights analysis unanimously adopted by the
Court in the Mille Lacs opinion."
In addition, taken as a whole, the treaties from 1795 to 1854,
brigaded by the verbal promise in 1863 as well as the Mille Lacs
majority and dissenting opinions' method for determining the
existence of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights, make
clear that U.S. treaty negotiators created such rights in treaties
with the Anishinabe over several decades and, because those
usufructuary property rights were never specifically abrogated
with the approval of Congress, those rights must certainly be alive
today. In retrospect, it now appears quite clear that prior to the
Supreme Court's analysis in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, neither the United States Government nor the
Court had yet grasped the significance of "early treaty-
guaranteed" usufructuary property rights. And, as a result,
United States v. Minnesota is not a comprehensive review of
treaties which have an impact on the treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary rights in question today (i.e., the 1795, 1825, 1826,
1837, 1854, and 1855, as well as the 1863 verbal promise by
Governor Ramsey) .29  The far more developed historical record
that can be found in both the LCO litigation and Mille Lacs, as
285. Treaty of 1855, supra note 174, at art. 1.
286. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200.
287. State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 433 (Minn. 1944) ("The ancient and
immemorial right to hunt and fish, which was 'not much less necessary to the
existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed,' remained in them
unless they granted it away.").
288. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207-08.
289. For an example, see Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614
F.2d 1161, 1162 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that the Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians gave up its rights to hunt, fish, trap, and gather wild rice free of
Minnesota's regulation of said activities).
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augmented by this Article, more accurately describes Anishinabe
rights post-Mille Lacs9
C. State v. Keezer
Another pre-Mille Lacs case that leads to the same conclusion
is State v. Keezer, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court, citing
United States v. Minnesota and Red Lake Band of Chippewa Band
Indians v. Minnesota, overturned a special three-judge panel
which had upheld the rights of two Anishinabe Band members to
gather wild rice guaranteed in the 1825 Treaty territory free from
state licensing regulation.2 '1 The defendants had been cited by a
conservation officer for harvesting wild rice on a lake designated
in the Sioux territory in the 1825 Treaty and included within the
2921795 Treaty area as Indian territory. Although a Minnesota
State Supreme Court opinion has little precedential value
regarding United States treaty construction and preceded the
Mille Lacs decision by nearly twenty years, it may be the only
attempt to come to grips with the pre-1837 treaties in any
published opinion . 29  The majority conceived of an Indian property
framework much more limited than that described by the Supreme
Court in the Mille Lacs opinion:
[F]ee title... became vested in the sovereign-first the
discovering European nation and later the original States and
the United States-a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes
was nevertheless recognized. That right, sometimes called
Indian title.., recognized to be only a right of occupancy ....
The Federal Government took early steps to deal with the
Indians through treaty, the principle [sic] purpose often being
to recognize and guarantee the rights of Indians to specified
areas of land.29 4
As conceived by the majority, treaties had dual purposes: (a)
to recognize Indians' right to occupancy of certain lands, and (b) to
gain territory for the United States through the Indians'
290. See, e.g., Mille Lacs 11, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997); LCO I, 700 F.2d 341
(7th Cir. 1983).
291. State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714, 721-22 (Minn. 1980).
292. Id. at 715.
293. As early as 1944, in State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 433 (1944), the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered that the Leech Lake Reservation, created in
the 1855 Treaty from "Indian Country" (carved out of the previously un-ceded 1825
and 1854 Treaty territories), did not require an explicit state right to hunt and fish
on the reservation because "the ancient and immemorial right to hunt and fish,
which was 'not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed,' remained in them unless granted away," citing United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
294. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).
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relinquishment of other lands.9 This exchange describes ceding
territory for a treaty guarantee to a reservation or another
territory.9 The majority equates this treaty-guaranteed "right of
occupancy," as it was called by John Marshall in Johnson v.
M'Intosh97 with "Indian title."'98 The majority appeared not to
recognize the concept of continuing use of the land, guaranteed by
treaty, in any meaningful way that would be cognizable as the
usufructuary property described in the Mille Lacs opinion. 99
The majority construed the 1795 Treaty to be a recognition of
"Indian title," and a relinquishment by the United States of "its
claims on [immediate possession of] Indian lands" but not a
relinquishment of "its basic sovereign rights to the land itself."'
The Indians gained a treaty-guaranteed right of occupancy that
could only be extinguished by purchase and "were free to enjoy
their rights of occupancy, 'hunting, planting, and dwelling there,'0 1
or as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described it, 'to use it according
to their own discretion."'3 0 2
However, what the majority described in post-Mille Lacs
terms is a treaty which has severed fee title from treaty-
guaranteed usufructuary property rights and contradicts the
court's assertion in United States v. Minnesota that the Red Lake
Band lacked treaty-guaranteed rights beyond "Indian title."' The
majority also purported to construe the 1825 Treaty as it related
to rights of the Anishinabe to gather wild rice on Sioux designated
territory without state permit.0 4 Echoing the district court in
United States v. Minnesota, and citing the Supreme Court holding
in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip15 and DeCoteau v. District County
Court"°' for the principle that language in the 1855 Treaty that
295. Id. See also Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 716.
296. Id.
297. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584-85 (1823) ("It has never been
doubted, that either the United States, or the several States, had a clear title to all
the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy ... ").
298. See Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 716.
299. See Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 661.
300. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 717.
301. Id. at 718.
302. Id. (citing M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574).
303. Id. at 721.
304. Id. at 724. And without the permission of the Dakota, as required in the
1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien, an issue not discussed by the Court. See 1825
Treaty of Prairie du Chien, supra note 82.
305. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
306. DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
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ceded "all right, title and interest" was "precisely suited" for the
purpose of eliminating "Indian title" and conveying to the
government "the Indians' entire interest in the ceded lands."3 7
The Court held that, even if the 1825 Treaty did
''grant ... hunting rights ... these rights were extinguished by
later treaties... [and] the Chippewa right of occupancy in
Minnesota, except for reservation land, was extinguished in the
Treaty of 1855."'  After the unanimous Supreme Court analysis
regarding treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights in
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, this is plainly
an incorrect statement of the law. 09
The State v. Keezer Dissent
More to the point was the dissent by Justice Rosalie Wahl,
joined by Justice Otis, who anticipated the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in the Mille Lacs decision and the Seventh Circuit
LCO decision regarding treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
rights.10  Justice Wahl considered that the United States
guaranteed an undifferentiated right to hunt, fish, and gather
within the 1795 Treaty territory relinquished by the United
States. 11 And, that the 1825 Treaty left it to the Anishinabe and
Dakota to continue to share fish, game, and wild rice without
United States interference. 2 Justice Wahl concluded, "rights of
ownership of the land itself, [are] not dependent upon [them], or
incident to, fee title.,
313
Justice Wahl's dissent was twenty years ahead of its time in
that, like the Mille Lacs majority, she rejected the argument that
general cession language, such as all "right, title and interest,"
without more, extinguished even aboriginal rights to hunt, fish, or
wild rice on ceded land. 4 Justice Wahl cited an earlier federal
court construction of the Nelson Act, the same 1889 congressional
enactment at issue in United States v. Minnesota, which was not
cited by the majority, the federal courts, or, presumably, the
plaintiffs counsel.1 According to Justices Wahl and Otis:
307. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 721.
308. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).






315. Id. at 714-22.
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In Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst,1'
however, the district court considered the same language
appearing in the Nelson Act, and held that it did not abrogate
hunting and fishing rights which 'while perhaps in fact dating
back many years to an aboriginal right were established in
law by treaty... [t]he United States Supreme Court has
counseled us that the abrogation of treaty rights is not to be
lightly inferred.' It is noteworthy that the Leech Lake Band
Court found that Chippewa hunting and fishing rights were
not extinguished by the 1855 treaty, in which the Indians
conveyed 'all right, title, and interest ... to any other land in
the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere.' 1
Justice Wahl's dissent also anticipated the co-management of
natural resources that has resulted in Wisconsin and portions of
Minnesota because of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
interests having been upheld in the 1837 and 1854 Treaties in the
Mille Lacs and LCO litigation. Justices Wahl and Otis:
[W]ould hold that while the state may regulate the exercise of
the Chippewa Indians' right to harvest wild rice to the extent
reasonable and necessary to conserve the state's wild rice
resources, Tulee v. Washington, the state may not require
them to purchase a license ... [this] is not to hold the
Chippewa Indians may hunt, fish or rice wherever they
choose. The... rights of private property owners who have
titles traceable to patents granted by the United States
government is not presented in this case.
This suggested framework for working through the complicated
conflicting issues created by the treaty-guaranteed property
rights, and subsequent property development, virtually duplicates
the resolution reached by the Seventh Circuit in the LCO case,
which has been applied in Minnesota's arrowhead region and
northern Wisconsin since 1988, and in the 1837 Treaty territory
since the Supreme Court decided the Mille Lacs case in 1999.31
Under the Mille Lacs analysis, this language would seem to
create a treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property right in the use
of the land indefinitely that had no apparent, or necessary,
relationship to "sale" of the land to the United States at any point.
There is nothing in the 1795 Treaty that would put any of the
tribal signatories on notice that "sale" to the United States implied
the concepts of "fee simple," "Indian right of occupancy," or "Indian
316. Id.
317. Id. at 724 (citation omitted).
318. Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
319. LCO I, 700 F.2d 341, 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the exercise of
property rights by the LCO Band is limited to those portions of the ceded lands
that are not privately owned).
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title," which have been used by the Supreme Court to construe the
1795 Treaty and later treaties.3 2' These court-created concepts
could only be found applicable to Indian treaties after Marbury v.
Madison established a role for the Supreme Court in 1803.321 And,
as the Minnesota Supreme Court majority pointed out in State v.
322Keezer, it was not until 1823 that Chief Justice John Marshall
conceptualized the "Indian Right of Occupancy" in Johnson v.
M'Intosh. However, there can be little question that, from the
Anishinabe standpoint, the guarantee of indeterminate rights to
hunt, fish, and wild rice in the Northwest Territory in 1795 and
after, became part of the tribal oral history, even if written treaty
guarantees and oral promises of U.S. treaty negotiators and
Minnesota Governors had been forgotten3 24 or ignored.
IV. POST-MILLE LACS USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE "RIGHT TO A MODEST LIVING"
Although the State of Minnesota was not a formal party to
the LCO litigation, it considered itself practically bound since at
least 1987, when it entered into the "Tri-Band Agreement" to
jointly manage wildlife resources in the 1854 ceded territory with
Anishinabe Bands in Minnesota's "arrowhead, 325 and settled a suit
320. Treaty of Greenville, supra note 76. See also Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 715.
321. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803) (affirming the principle of
judicial review).
322. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 716.
323. For example, see Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823) (utilizing the
phrase "Indian Right of Occupancy" regarding conveyance of title).
324. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161, 1161
(8th Cir. 1980).
325. The Agreement between the Grand Portage, Boise Forte, and the Fond du
Lac Bands of Chippewa and the State of Minnesota, 1987:
III. CONDITIONS
A. This Agreement is contingent upon adoption by the Minnesota
Legislature, at the 1988 Session, thereof of legislation effectuating the
terms of this Agreement, and is further contingent upon the Governor
signing such legislation into law.
B. The Agreement is contingent upon ratification of governing bodies of
the Grand Portage, Bois Forte and Fond du Lac Bands ....
D. If legislation effectuating the terms of this Agreement is enacted into
law, all parties will apply to the Court for entry of a consent judgment
consistent with the terms of this Agreement ....
F. Until such time as a Tri-Band Code and Grand Portage Code have been
duly adopted pursuant to this Agreement, the Three Bands shall abide by
all provisions of state law when hunting and fishing ....
See Peter Erlinder, The Anishinabe Nation's "Right to a Modest Living" From the
Exercise of Off-Reservation Usufructuary Treaty Rights ... in All of Northern
Law and Inequality
with the Grand Portage Band of Chippewa, based on the same
1854 Treaty.326 The stakes can be significant.327
Despite the 1854 Treaty specifically providing that the
Mississippi Band retained 1825 and 1826 Treaty-guaranteed-
rights west of the 1854 Treaty boundary, Minnesota has not
acknowledged that all Anishinabe Bands to which the 1854 Treaty
apparently refers18  should have the same off-reservation
usufructuary rights 29  as Anishinabe in Wisconsin and
Minnesota, property rights with a value of millions of dollars
annually, according to the State.3 1  The value of native
Minnesota 20 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with William Mitchell College of
Law) [hereinafter Erlinder, Anishinabe Nation].
326. The State of Minnesota settled Grand Portage Band of Chippewa of Lake
Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-85-90 (D. Minn. 1988) following the LCO
decisions upholding the 1854 Treaty.
327. Reis, supra note 30. See also Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
328. The contradiction is apparent in off-reservation prosecution of Indians in
territory outside the 1854 Treaty-ceded territory which must acknowledge both
Mille Lacs and LCO I as controlling regarding usufructuary rights, but find
exceptions based on treaty boundaries to permit prosecutions that would not be
possible a few miles in either direction. See State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 784
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
329. See GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH AND WILDLIFE COMM'N (GLIFWC), A GUIDE
TO UNDERSTANDING CHIPPEWA TREATY RIGHTS: MINNESOTA EDITION (1995)
(describing the self-management Wisconsin Bands have chosen, as has the Fond du
lac Band in Minnesota).
330. The usufructuary rights leased by the State in the arrowhead region were
valued at approximately $6 million annually in 1988. The 2010-11 Biennial
Budget of Minnesota Department of Natural Resources reflects payments of about
$7.5 million annually for treaty rights (an estimated average value of $6.5 million
over the past twenty-two years) would mean that the State has set the value of a
small portion of the ceded area at about $140 million over twenty-plus years.
However, the area west of the 1854 Treaty border and north of the 1937 Treaty
border is much larger than that ceded in the 1837 and 1854 Treaties, and includes
prime fishing and hunting locations in the Gull Lake, Brainerd, and Bemidji areas.
This means that the direct loss to the largest Anishinabe Bands, in territory that
was un-ceded in 1854 and in which usufructuary rights were not abrogated
subsequently, must be in the range of some $280 million, over just the past twenty-
some years. See FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP'T, MINN. H. OF REP., MINNESOTA'S GENERAL
FUND BUDGET FOR THE FY 2010-11 BIENNIUM (Oct. 2009). In addition, hundreds if
not thousands of Anishinabe Band members have been unlawfully arrested,
incarcerated and/or fined by the State, for arguably exercising off-reservation
usufructuary activities, or subject to tribal jurisdiction. See Butcher, 563 N.W.2d at
776 and the Tunheim Order, supra note 23. These direct and indirect damages are
incalculable.
331. Tri-Band Agreement art. IV:
OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS OF THE STATE:
A. Annual Payment: The State shall pay annually to the Grand Portage
Band and Bois Forte Band the sum of one million six hundred thousand
dollars ($1,600,000 each, and to the Fond du Lac Band the sum of one
[Vol. 33: 143
USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY RIGHTS
usufructuary property rights was first estimated by the Seventh
CircuitI12 and the Wisconsin federal courts, which recognized that
the 1854 Treaty guaranteed the right of the Anishinabe to "enjoy a
modest living" from their exercise of usufructuary rights.3 In
LCO V, the federal district court determined the economic value of
the "modest standard of living" guaranteed under the 1854 Treaty:
Plaintiffs have shown that their modest living needs cannot be
met from the present available harvest even if they were
physically capable of harvesting, processing, and gathering it.
The standard of a modest living does not provide a practical




The modest standard of living guaranteed to plaintiffs under
the 1837 and 1842 treaties may be quantified as a zero
335
savings ....
The federal district court also found that in 1986, the average
income level for a household that did not save anything was
$20,036.3 The court found that "[to provide plaintiffs the
equivalent of a modest standard of living for the households of
tribal members would require approximately $82,000,000.
'3 7
Even if the income level required was equal to the average income
of American Indians, it would take $22.5 million, or $4 million
more than the land could produce under optimal conditions, to
satisfy the moderate living standard.38 The court concluded that
"[u]nder the most optimal conditions, capture of the entire
potential harvest of the ceded territory could produce no more
than $18,000,000 in foods, pelts, and timber for personal
consumption and sale.
33 9
million eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($1,850,000) paid by the
State pursuant to the settlement of litigation referenced in Minn. Stat. §§
97A.151 and 97A.155 (1986) shall be matched dollar for dollar, in the
payments made to each of the Three Bands. This formula shall continue
to apply to the Three Bands even if it may in the future no longer apply to
Leech Lake Band.
See also Erlinder, Anishinabe Nation, supra note 325, at 21.
332. See, e.g., LCO 11, 760 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); LCO I, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1983).
333. This, of course, means that usufructuary rights remain intact in un-ceded
territory as well.
334. LCO V, 686 F. Supp. 226, 233 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
335. Id. at 230.
336. Id. at 228.





In a later district court proceeding, the court held that, on the
issue of fish in the ceded territory, resources should be allocated
equally (50%) between Indians and non-Indians:
[T]he parties did not intend that plaintiffs' reserved rights
would entitle them to the full amount of the harvestable
resources in the ceded territory, even if their modest living
needs would otherwise require it. The non-Indians gained
harvesting rights under those same treaties that must be
recognized. The bargain between the parties included
competition for the harvest. How to quantify the bargained-
for competition is a difficult question. The only reasonable
and logical resolution is that the contending parties share the
harvest equally.340
Central to the court's analysis was the finding in LCO IV,
where the court found that "even if the tribes could exploit every
harvestable natural resource in the ceded territory, they would not
derive sufficient income from those resources to provide their
members with a moderate standard of living. 341 The exercise of
usufructuary rights for individual tribal members, even if
insufficient to provide a livable income, hold the promise of
supplementing both income and diet for enrolled tribal members
who live on or near reservations in conditions almost as shocking
as those who moved the U.S. treaty negotiators in 1826, according
to studies published as recently as 2005:
Tribal communities tend to be poorer and have higher
unemployment levels than most other communities:
e Recent census data show that the poverty rate in
reservation areas is approximately 50%, almost four
times the United States average, and that the poverty
rate for Indian children in reservation areas is 60%.
e Other federal data show that, as of 1999, over 40% of
all adults living on or near reservations were
unemployed and that over 30% of those employed were
still living in poverty.
Tribal populations tend to face increased risk of public health
threats from environmental contamination and are subject to
impacts from environmental degradation to a greater extent
than other population segments:
e Tribal communities tend to consume larger quantities
of fish, game and other natural foods than other
communities, and thus face higher health risks posed by
bioaccumulative toxics.
0 In 2001, approximately 34% of drinking water
suppliers in Indian country violated monitoring and
340. LCO IV, 740 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
341. Id. at 1413.
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reporting requirements and approximately 5% violated
maximum contaminant level/treatment technologies.
The vast majority of the public water systems with
significant noncompliance have been out of compliance
for nine months or more.
e Many Tribal Nations have no waste management
program at all and use dumps or burn barrels as the
primary method of waste disposal.
According to a 1999 Indian Health Service report, tribal
communities face significant disparities vis-L-vis other
communities regarding disease and mortality rates:
e Tribal communities have higher incidences than other
communities of certain diseases, such as diabetes,
cardiovascular diseases and hypertension, obesity, gall-
bladder disease, and dental disease.
e Age-adjusted death rates for the following causes were
considerably higher than those for other population
segments in 1995: alcoholism-627 percent greater;
tuberculosis-533 percent greater; diabetes mellitus-
249 percent greater; accidents-204 percent greater;
suicide-72 percent greater, pneumonia and influenza-
71 percent greater; and homicide-63 percent greater.
Studies have shown a clear relationship between the use of
traditional foods and the health and well-being of tribal
members, including:
" The improvement of diet and nutrient intake.
" The prevention of chronic diseases.
" The opportunities for physical fitness and outdoor
activities associated with harvesting traditional
foods.
* The opportunity to experience, learn, and promote
cultural activities.
The scope of usufructuary rights in the 19 h Century included
a broad range of land use activities that the LCO litigation first
attempted to catalogue.3 43 The scope of the exercise of these rights,
342. GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION, TRIBAL NATIONS ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 3-4 (Version 1.0, Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://www.glrc.us/
documents/strategy/GLRC-Tribal-Briefing-Paper.pdf.
343. As the Court explained in LCO III, 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1426-28 (W.D. Wis.
1987):
As of 1837 and 1842, the Chippewa exploited virtually every resource in
the ceded territory. Among the mammals the Chippewa hunted at treaty
time were white-tailed deer, black bear, muskrat, beaver, marten, mink,
fisher, snowshoe hare, cottontail rabbit, badger, porcupine, moose,
woodchuck, squirrel, raccoon, otter, lynx, fox, wolf, elk, and bison.
Among the birds the Chippewa hunted were ducks, geese, songbirds,
various types of grouse, turkeys, hawks, eagles, owls, and partridges.
2015]
Law and Inequality
Among the fish the Chippewa harvested were, in Lake Superior, whitefish,
herring, chubs, lake trout and turbot; and, in-shore, suckers, walleye,
pike, sturgeon, muskie, and perch.
The Chippewa also harvested a large number of plants and plant
materials, including: box elder, sugar maple, arum-leaved arrow-head,
smooth sumac, staghorn sumac, wild ginger, common milkweed, yellow
birch, hazelnut, beaked hazelnut, nannyberry, climbing bitter-sweet,
large-leaved aster, Philadelphia fleabane, dandelion, panicled dogwood,
large toothwort, cucumber, Ojibwe squash, large pie pumpkin, gourds,
field horsetail, bog rosemary, leather leaf, wintergreen, Labrador tea,
cranberry, blueberry, beech, white oak, bur oak, red oak, black oak, corn,
wild rice, Virginia waterleaf, shell bark hickory, butternut, wild mint,
catnip, hog peanut, creamy vetchling, navy bean, lima bean, cranberry
pole bean, lichens, wild onion, wild leek, false spikenard, sweet white
water lily, yellow lotus, red ash, white pine, hemlock, brake, marsh
marigold, smooth juneberry, red haw apple, wild strawberry, wild plum,
pin cherry, sand cherry, wild cherry, choke cherry, highbush blackberry,
red raspberry, large-toothed aspen, prickly gooseberry, wild black currant,
wild red currant, smooth gooseberry, Ojibwe potato, hop, Virginia creeper,
river-bank grape, red maple, mountain maple, spreading dogbane, paper
birch, low birch, downy arrowwood, woolly yarrow, white sage, alternate-
leaved dogwood, wool grass, great bulrush, scouring rush, sweet grass,
Dudley's rush, marsh vetchling, sweet fern, black ash, balsam fir,
tamarack, black spruce, jack pine, Norway pine, arbor vitae (white cedar),
hawthorn, shining willow, sphagnum moss, basswood, cat-tail, wood
nettle, slippery elm, and Lyall's nettle, poison ivy, winterberry, mountain
holly, sweet flag, Indian turnip, wild sarsaparilla, ginseng, spotted touch-
me-not, blue cohosh, speckled elder, hound's tongue, marsh bellflower,
harebell, bush honeysuckle, red elderberry, snowberry, highbush
cranberry, white campion, yarrow, pearly everlasting, lesser cat's foot,
common burdock, ox-eye daisy, Canada thistle, common thistle, daisy
fleabane, Joe-Pye weed, tall blue lettuce, white lettuce, black-eyed Susan,
golden ragwort, entire-leaved groundsel, Indian cup plant, fragrant
golden-rod, tansy, cocklebur, bunch berry, tower mustard, marsh cress,
tansy-mustard, squash, wild balsam-apple, hare's tail, wood horsetail,
prince's pine, flowering spurge, golden corydalis, giant puffball, wild
geranium, rattlesnake grass, blue flag, wild bergamot, heal-all, marsh
skullcap, white sweet clover, reindeer moss, northern clintonia, Canada
mayflower, small Solomon's seal, star-flowered Solomon's seal, carrion
flower, twisted stalk, large flowered bellwort, ground pine, Canada
moonseed, heart-leaved umbrella-wort, yellow water lily, great willow-
herb, evening primrose, Virginia grape fern, yellow ladies' slipper, rein
orchis, adder's mouth, bloodroot, white spruce, common plantain, Carey's
persicaria, swamp persicaria, curled dock, shield fern, female fern,
sensitive fern, red baneberry, Canada anemone, thimble-weed, wild
columbine, gold thread, bristly crowfoot, cursed crowfoot, purple meadow
rue, agrimony, large-leaved aven, rough cinquefoil, marsh five-finger,
smooth rose, high bush blackberry, meadow-sweet, steeple bush, goose
grass, small cleaver, small bedstraw, prickly ash, balsam poplar, large
toothed aspen, quaking aspen, crack willow, bog willow, pitcher-plant,
butter and eggs, cow wheat, wood betony, mullein, moosewood, musquash
root, cow parsnip, sweet cicely, wild parsnip, black snakeroot, Canada
violet, American dog violet, speckled alder, sweet gale, goldthread,
bluewood aster, horseweed, Canada hawkweed, fragrant goldenrod, shin
leaf, sessile-leaved bellwort, slender ladies' tresses, and starflower.
The Chippewa harvested other miscellaneous resources, such as turtles
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according to the court, continues to exist throughout the entire
ceded territory with the possible exception of "private land" that
had been occupied by settlers at the time of the treaty, unless the
exercise of usufructuary rights on private property was necessary
for the Anishinabe, in which case the court invited the Anishinabe
to return to establish that the available public land was
insufficient for their support.344 The findings of the federal district
court in LCO III described the rights retained by the Lake
Superior Band, including: "[The] rights to all the forms of animal
life, fish, vegetation.., and use of all methods of harvesting
employed in treaty times and those developed since .... The
fruits... may be traded and sold to non-Indians, employing
modern methods of distribution and sale .... [T]o enjoy a modest
living .... "3 As part of the Mille Lacs treaty rights litigation in
the 1990s, the Eighth Circuit noted that "usufructuary rights
reserved by the Band included the rights to harvest resources for
commercial purposes, and were not limited to use of any particular
techniques, methods, devices or gear." ' Technological advances
in weaponry, transport, husbandry, gathering, and processing
were all part of Anishinabe usufructuary property rights in the 19 h
Century and now in the 21" Century.
4 7
V. PROSPECTS FOR 21ST CENTURY RESOURCE CO-
MANAGEMENT IN ALL OF NORTHERN MINNESOTA-
1825 AND 1826 "SOVEREIGNTY TREATY" TERRITORY
The Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution establishes
a direct relationship between the Federal Government and Tribal
Nations. 8 In addition, Congress has specifically provided for a
tribal role in the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act,350 Safe
Drinking Water Act [Public Health Service Act],31 and the
and turtle eggs. The most important game for the Chippewa was the
white-tailed deer.
344. Id. at 1426-28.
345. Id. at 1435.
346. Mille Lacs 11, 124 F.3d 904, 911 (8th Cir. 1997).
347. Erlinder, Anishinabe Nation, supra note 325, at 5 (discussing how
Anishinabe usufructuary rights must adapt to include the use of modern
technology).
348. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress shall have power "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes").
349. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2014).
350. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2014).
351. Id. §§ 300f-300j-26.
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Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act." 2
Tribal members may be entitled to expressly retain U.S.
treaty-guaranteed modern usufructuary rights, but tribal
property rights do not exist in a vacuum and, as described in the
Mille Lacs Eighth Circuit litigation, must co-exist with lawful
state regulatory authority: "[Any regulation imposed by the State
must be necessary to ensure public health and safety, and the
State could not impose its own regulations if the Chippewa could
establish tribal regulations adequate to meet conservation, public
health and public safety needs."5 4 The Supreme Court came to a
similar conclusion in the Mille Lacs opinion:
Although States have important interests in regulating
wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this
authority is shared when the Federal Government exercises
one of its enumerated constitutional powers, such as treaty
making .... Here, the 1837 Treaty gave the Chippewa the
right to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory free of
territorial, and later state, regulation, a privilege that others
did not enjoy. Today, this freedom from state regulation
curtails the State's ability to regulate hunting, fishing, and
gathering by the Chippewa in the ceded lands. But this
Court's cases have also recognized that Indian treaty-based
usufructuary rights do not guarantee the Indians "absolute
freedom" from state regulation .... We have repeatedly
reaffirmed state authority to impose reasonable and necessary
nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights in the interest of conservation.
Growing recognition that state governments are obligated to
adhere to treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights can be
seen in Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton's Executive Order No.
13-10 of August 8, 2013 that directs identified state agencies3 6 to
implement consultation policies with Minnesota's eleven federally-
recognized Tribal Nations. 7
I, Mark Dayton, Governor of the State of Minnesota, by
352. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
353. United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 2007).
354. Mille Lacs 11, 124 F.3d 904, 911 (8th Cir. 1997).
355. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 204-05 (1999) (citations omitted).
356. All other Cabinet-level Executive Branch agencies shall coordinate, as
needed, with the tribal liaison in the Governor's Office to consult with the
Minnesota Tribal Nations.
357. Governor's Exec. Order No. 13-10 (Aug. 8, 2013), available at
http://mn.gov/governor/images/EO-13-10.pdf [hereinafter Dayton Exec. Order]
(rescinding former Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty's earlier Order affirming




virtue of the power invested in me by the Constitution and
applicable statutes, do hereby issue this Executive Order:
Whereas, the United States and the State of Minnesota have
a unique legal relationship with federally recognized Tribal
Nations, as affirmed by the Constitution of the United States,
treaties, statutes, and case law; ....
Now, Therefore, I hereby order that:
1. All Executive Branch agencies of the State of Minnesota
shall recognize the unique legal relationship between the
State of Minnesota and the Minnesota Tribal Nations, respect
the fundamental principles that establish and maintain this
relationship, and accord Tribal Governments the same respect
accorded to other governments.
2. By March 10, 2014, the following Cabinet-level Executive
Branch agencies (hereinafter 'Cabinet Agency' and 'Cabinet
Agencies') shall, in consultation with the Minnesota Tribal
Nations, develop and implement tribal consultation policies to
guide their work and interaction with the Minnesota Tribal
Nations ....
3. As appropriate, and at the earliest opportunity, Cabinet
Agencies shall consult with the Minnesota Tribal Nations ....
Cabinet Agencies shall consider the input generated from
tribal consultation into their decision-making processes, with
the goal of achieving mutually beneficial solutions.
4. Each Cabinet Agency shall designate a staff member to
assume responsibility for implementation of the tribal
consultation policy and to serve as the principal point of
contact for the Minnesota Tribal Nations.
5. All Cabinet Agencies shall provide training for designated
staff who work with the Minnesota Tribal Nations in an effort
to foster a collaborative relationship between the State of
Minnesota and the Minnesota Tribal Nations.
Executive Order 13-10 does not create rights or provide judicial
review, but it does provide evidence that Minnesota state agencies,
like never before, must actively consider "laws, rules, directives, or
other legal requirements or obligations imposed by state or federal
law, or set forth in agreements or compacts between one or more of
the Minnesota Tribal Nations or any other Tribal Nation and the







A. Co-Management of Treaty-Guaranteed Usufructuary
Property Rights: Preventing an Unconstitutional
"Taking" Protecting Natural Resources for All
However, the question remaining in both Wisconsin and
Minnesota for the 21" Century with respect to the now well-
established principle of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
rights will be the scope of those rights in off-reservation treaty
territory as well as on-reservation. The late 20 h Century saw
environmental regulation and respect for healthy resource
development emerge as major issues, based largely on state and
federal administrative regulation.6 Recognition of off-reservation
usufructuary property rights requiring protection suggests that
native people will have an increasingly important place at that
table6 1 when decisions are made and income is distributed
regarding wildlife harvesting and resource development in
territory covered by treaties that guarantee usufructuary property
interests to native peoples.6 2 A model of state-tribal co-
management is the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife
Commission (GLIFWC).6 The GLIFWC is a co-management and
licensing body created by Anishinabe Bands in the 1854 Treaty
territory to implement the resource-sharing concept required by
the treaty-guarantees of the United States upheld in the LCO
litigation. In Minnesota and Wisconsin, both Lake Superior Band
descendants (the Fond du Lac Band) and Mississippi Band
descendants (the White Earth and Leech Lake Bands) have opted
for co-management systems that are either in operation or in the
process of being established. 4 The post-Mille Lacs precedent for
such a concept can be found in the early 21" Century challenge of
the Mole Lake Chippewa Band to the siting of a mine in Crandon,
Wisconsin, within the 1854 Treaty territory, citing the Seventh
Circuit LCO opinions and the harm the mine would cause in the
ability of the Band to exercise its usufructuary rights reflected in
360. Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra note 1, at 10933.
361. Dayton Exec. Order, supra note 357 (stating that Cabinet Agencies will
work with Minnesota Tribal Nations on a number of policies and procedures that
will affect Minnesota Tribal Nations).
362. Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra note 1, at 10933-34.
363. Tom Busiahn & Jonathan Gilbert, The Role of Ojibwe Tribes in the Co-
Management of Natural Resource in the Upper Great Lakes Region: A Success Story
(2009), available at http://www.glifwc.org/minwaajimo/Papers/Co-management%20
Paper%20Busiahn%20%20FINAL.pdf.
364. Id. (discussing how co-management as a concept was never officially




the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Environmental
Impact Statement ("EIS").t
B. Mille Lacs Usufructuary Property Off-Reservation: The
Crandon Mine Dispute
An example of "dual management" of usufructuary property
in 1854 Treaty territory in practice was the 2002 dispute over a
proposed mining operation in north central Wisconsin in which
Anishinabe usufructuary property rights were part of the
discussion in the siting of a mining operation in Crandon,
Wisconsin." The 1854 Treaty-guaranteed property interests were
a factor in the EPA's EIS and in the "scoping report" of the Army
Corps of Engineers:
4.2.9 Indian Trust Assets
Indian Trust Assets include on- and off-reservation issues
about water, fishing, hunting, gathering, and other resources
guaranteed by Treaty rights... [including] contamination of
water from a leak or spill, and other Treaty rights related to
water... [and] contaminants affecting fish and other aquatic
resources, and other Treaty rights related to fishing, fish and
other aquatic resources .... [As well as] Treaty rights related
to hunting and wildlife species.., and other Treaty rights
related to gathering wild rice, other plants, and medicines.
4.3.3 Wild Rice
Wild rice includes issues about contaminants and
geochemistry, harvesting, water levels, and development from
population growth .... Development issues include indirect
impacts on wild rice from population growth and associated
housing, road building, and other development occurring
outside the boundaries of the Mole Lake Reservation.6 7
The impact of land use issues on the harvest of wildlife is not
limited to the economic impact alone. The EPA studies evaluating
the impact on treaty-protected rights extends to the entire treaty
territory."8 Further, the social dimension, as destruction of the
ability to exercise usufructuary property rights has devastated
Anishinabe communities, must be considered as well:
4.2.7 Socioeconomics
Native American community issues include impacts on social
365. Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra note 1, at 10934.
366. Natalie Jablonski, Looking Back on a Mine Controversy: What Does the
Crandon Mine Story Mean Today?, MIRROR OF THE NORTHWOODS, WINDOW ON THE
WORLD (Oct. 28, 2013), http://wxpr.org/post/what-does-crandon-mine-story-mean-
today.
367. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, CRANDON MINE PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT DRAFT (2002) [hereinafter CRANDON EIS].
368. Erlinder, Ten Years On, supra note 1, at 10934.
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and economic systems, cultural, spiritual, well-being, and
subsistence aspects of Native American life, racism in schools,
loss or decline of wild rice production, and changes in utilities,
housing, employment, and income during and after the
project.
C. PolyMet Mining and "Sandpiper" Pipeline Proposals in
Minnesota's 1854 Treaty Territory: Mille Lacs
Usufructuary Property Analysis and the Crandon Mine
Experience
A situation similar to the Crandon Mine arose recently in
Minnesota that threatens the off-reservation usufructuary
property of the Anishinabe in the siting and permitting of the
PolyMet Mining operation proposed for the 1854 Treaty
territory.370 In late 2013, the PolyMet Mining Company filed a
preliminary EIS, which proposes a copper-nickel mine on the site
of a former iron mine in Northern Minnesota and concedes that
sulphuric acid will be a by-product of twenty years of mine
production for some 500 years.371 The proposed mine is located in
the 1854 Treaty-ceded territory which the State of Minnesota, the
State of Wisconsin, the Seventh Circuit, and the Mille Lacs
majority and dissent all have acknowledged as treaty-created
usufructuary property in favor of the Anishinabe in the entire
ceded territory, not just on the reservations within the Treaty-
ceded territory. In 2002, the off-reservation usufructuary property
rights of the Mole Lake Band proved decisive in preventing the
siting of gold and copper mines upstream of the reservation proper
based on the 1854 Treaty.7 2 On October 28, 2004, the Sokaogon
369. CRANDON EIS, supra note 367. The Crandon Mine site was never approved
and was eventually purchased by the tribe.
370. PolyMet Mine Proposal, MINING TRUTH, http://www.miningtruth.org/sulfide
-mining-minnesota/polymet-mine-proposal/#.VBdS4hbuqYQ.
371. Id.
372. Jablonski, supra note 366.
Today marks 10 years since a proposal for a copper and zinc mine in
Forest County came to an end. Members of the Mole Lake Sokaogon
Chippewa and Menominee tribes gathered this weekend to celebrate ...
but pointed out that mining remains a controversial issue in northern
Wisconsin.
First Exxon and later BHP Billiton proposed to open a copper and zinc
mine near Crandon, Wisconsin. But the mine site was close to the pristine
Wolf River. The Menominee Reservation was 40 miles downstream, and
the Mole Lake Reservation was even closer. The tribes worried water
pollution could ruin their sacred beds of wild rice.
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Chippewa Community Mole Lake Band and the Forest County
Potawatomi Community bought Nicolet Minerals and the Crandon
land for $16.5 million, including all mineral rights.373
Based on the Crandon Mine precedent under the same 1854
Treaty, before the PolyMet project can go forward, the Anishinabe
must be recognized as equal partners with the State of Minnesota
with equal usufructuary property rights to protect in all of the
1854 Treaty territory, not just the reservations which might be
impacted, before the mine is permitted.374 The 500 years' residual
impact the proposed mine will have on the usufructuary property
interests of the Ojibwe is much, much longer than the iconic "the
seventh generation" decision-making often attributed to native
peoples. The Mille Lacs usufructuary property analysis creates
the possibility for due process challenges to the unconstitutional
"taking" of these 21" Century property interests of this and future
generations that did not exist before the Mille Lacs Court
In 2002 the Mole Lake Sokaogon tribe won the right as a sovereign nation
to set its own standards for air and water quality. Mole Lake Sokaogan
Tribal chairman Chris McGeshick says that meant it could set strict limits
on pollutants.
"Enacting our own water quality standards. I feel that was the turning
point, where the tribe-our rights were recognized as a government, to
have the ability to adopt and enforce our own water quality regulations
within this watershed."
The following year, the nearly three-decade fight ended. October 28th
marks ten years since Mole Lake Sokaogon and Forest County Potawatomi
purchased the mine site for more than 16 million dollars.
Some see parallels between the Crandon mine story and Gogebic
Taconite's plan for a Penokee mine. Like activist Francis Van Zile. She
was involved in the fight against the Crandon mine since the 70s.
373. Controversial Mineral Deposit Sold, GEOTIMES (last visited Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.geotimes.org/jan04/resources.html. See also Amy Rinard & Meg Jones,
Tribes' Purchase Ends Crandon Mine Tussle: Mining Company Says 'Hostile
Political Climate' Doomed Project, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 29, 2003),
http://ecoearth.info/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkID=26666.
374. See Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding the
EPA treatment of the Reservation as a "state" for management of water quality
standards, pursuant to the 1854 Treaty).
375. LINDA CLARKSON ET AL., OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SEVENTH
GENERATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 7 (1992)
("The original law passed down from their ancestors crystallizes the sacred
responsibility of Indigenous people to be the caretaker of all that is on Mother
Earth and therefore that each generation is responsible to ensure the survival for
the seventh generation.").
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identified these interests for what they are: "usufructuary
property.,
376
In "Indian Country" beyond the treaty territory discussed in
this Article, the Keystone XL Pipeline has become an international
focus of attention for a growing coalition with interests that
coincide with the Dakota, Ojibwe, and other Indian Nations with
treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property interests threatened by
pipeline operations.377 However, within the 1825 and 1826 Treaty
territory, of which the 1854 and 1855 Treaty territories are a
part378 a Minnesota version of the Keystone XL opposition
movement is growing in response to the "Sandpiper" Pipeline
application filed by a Canadian pipeline with the Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission ("PUC") to construct a heavy-oil pipeline
from North Dakota to the east and south through the lakes region
at the headwaters of the Mississippi, 3 79 an area with some of the
most hydrologically-sensitive groundwater flows in the state
according to fifty years of U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") data.3 16
In hearings before the Commission and using the Mille Lacs
treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights analysis as a
starting point, Indian and non-Indian opponents of the Sandpiper
376. Another example of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property interests
playing a role in the permitting and regulating process is taking place in the
"Sandpiper" oil pipeline currently pending before the Minnesota Public Utility
Commission ("PUC"). Canadian pipeline company, Enbridge, is seeking to
construct a pipeline to transport North Dakota and Canadian oil across Minnesota
to transfer points on the lower Mississippi and Great Lakes. Enbridge proposes to
cross the headwaters of the Mississippi, certified organic wild rice beds, and other
sensitive environmental areas. Environmental Impact Statements considering the
impact of the pipeline on the native population's right to a "modest living" from
exercise of usufructuary property rights, similar to those in the Crandon Mine
example above, have been requested by members of the White Earth and Leech
Lake Bands in the current permitting process. For example, Wisconsin has an
outline for an EIS. See WIS. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR ENBRIDGE SANDPAPER PETROLEUM PIPELINE AND RELATED PROJECTS OUTLINE
(2014), available at http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/EIA/documents/Enbridge/SandpiperLine
3EISOutline.pdf.
377. Mitch Smith, Nebraskans Raise Their Voices in Fight Against Keystone XL
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/us/key
stone-xl-pipeline-nebraska-opponents.html?_r=0.
378. See infra Appendices I and II.
379. Pub. Util. Comm'n Docket Description: Sandpiper Pipeline Project, PUC
Docket No. PL6668/PPL-13-474.
380. USGS has been identifying and mapping aquifers across the U.S., including
those in Minnesota, for many decades and often in collaboration with Minnesota's
DNR, Pollution Control Agency, and the Department of Health. Numerous reports
exist about aquifers and aquifer vulnerability in specific locations within
Minnesota from the USGS Minnesota Water Science Center. For information
about aquifers provided by the Minnesota DNR, see MINN. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES.
AQUIFERS, available at http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/groundwater/aquifers.html.
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Pipeline introduced written and oral evidence documenting the
unique characteristics of the land and water resources for the
exercise of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary rights in treaty
territory.381  On August 21, 2014, the Minnesota DNR and
Pollution Control Agency ("PCA") each submitted comments
opposing the route originally proposed by Enbridge.382
On September 11, 2014, the Commission voted to reconsider
the Sandpiper proposal as to need, and to consider alternative
routes if need for the pipeline can be substantiated in the first
place."' The continuing and future role of the treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property interests, which are common to the Mole
Lake Band in the Crandon Mine permitting issue and the
Minnesota Bands in the Sandpiper matter under the 1854 and
1855 Treaties, are in the historic process of development now:1
4
Enbridge's proposed route for its Sandpiper line traverses a
significant portion of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa's 1854 ceded territory. The Band is responsible for
protecting natural resources both on the reservation and
within its ceded territories. The Band's concerns about the
route encompass the need to protect Band self-sufficiency and
cultural practices ... (and) lack of tribal consultation on the
381. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n Decisions: PUC Agenda Meeting, Docket No.
PL6668/PPL-13-474 (2014), recording available at https://minnesotapuc.legistar.
com/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=325625&GUID=4AOF4B38-E454-4DAB-AAE7-DC8A
22AD711D&Options=info I &Search=. There are also several supporting documents
for the hearing, available at https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/
searchDocuments.do?method=eDocketsResult&docketYear= 13&docketNumber=47
4. See also David Schaffer, Minnesota Regulators Order a Broader Look at Pipeline
Route, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.startribune.combusiness/274834771
.html.
Minnesota regulators on Thursday ordered a broader search for the best
pathway to build a major new crude oil pipeline across the state. The 3-2
decision by the state Public Utilities Commission was a setback for
Enbridge Energy, which wants to build the $2.6 billion Sandpiper pipeline
through northern Minnesota to carry North Dakota oil to a terminal in
Superior, Wis., that feeds refineries across the Midwest.
Id.
382. See Dep't of Natural Res. & Pollution Control Agency, Comments submitted
to Pub. Util. Comm'n Docket No. PL6668/PPL- 13-474 (Aug. 21, 2014).
383. Schaffer, supra note 381 (noting that Minnesota regulators ordered a
search for alternative pathways during a meeting held on September 11, 2014).
384. On September 29, 2014, Chairwoman Karen Diver of Fond du Lac Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa sent a letter to the Executive Secretary of the PUC
providing notice of threats to on- and off-reservation 1854 Treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property interests. See Letter from Karen Diver, Chairwoman, Fond
du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, to Dr. Burl W. Haar, Exec. Sec'y Minn.
Pub. Util. Comm'n. (Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with Minn. Dep't of Commerce). These
are exactly the issues raised under the 1854 Treaty in the aforementioned Crandon
Mine dispute, and the assertion of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
interests advocated by this Article.
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environmental review process and identification of
historically, archaeologically and culturally significant
lands .... [T]he Band's subsistence lifestyle is based upon the
harvest of healthy fish, game, wild rice, maple sugar,
medicinal plants and forest products. We have been able to
sustain this way of life because our local ecosystem is still
largely intact.
The letter does not cite the Voigt litigation, but does cite the 1854
Treaty upon which the LCO cases turned, and upon which the
Mille Lacs analysis of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
interests was based. However, the Enbridge Sandpiper Pipeline
permitting issue, with the Crandon Mine litigation as legal,
political, and historical precedent,386 has put the scope of Mille
Lacs property protections in environmental and resource
permitting squarely on the agenda in the 21" Century. In an
Securities Exchange Commission filing on September 30, 2014,
Enbridge announced that completion of the Sandpiper Pipeline
project would be delayed by at least a year, until 2017.387
385. Id.
386. See generally Rinard & Jones, supra note 373.
387. John Myers, Enbrdge Delays Proposed Sandpiper Completion, GRAND FORKS HERALD
(Sept. 30, 2014):
Enbridge Energy Inc. on Tuesday said its proposed Sandpiper oil pipeline
between western North Dakota and Superior, Wis., won't be completed
until 2017, about a year behind the company's original estimate.
Enbridge announced the delay in a filing with the federal Securities and
Exchange Commission, noting that it is a material change in the
company's plans that stockholders need to know about ....
Al Monaco, Enbridge's president and CEO, said in Toronto that the delay
was caused by the Minnesota regulator's decision to split a review of the
public need for the line and its routing into two separate hearings.
The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission is taking longer than expected
to approve possible routes for the pipeline that need to be thoroughly
studied for environmental and social impacts. The company hoped to limit
those possible routes to two options.
On Sept. 11, the PUC opened up the possibility that other routes might
have to be included for study.
Several groups have organized to propose additional routes, or oppose the
line altogether, saying Minnesota shouldn't have to bear the risk for oil
that will mostly go to other states. They cite the possibility of pipeline
spills into northern Minnesota lakes, rivers, and wetlands, and some
groups have proposed new routes that would take the line south, through
more farmland and urban areas.
The $2.6 billion, 616-mile Sandpiper line is needed, supporters say, to
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In the 191 Century, Minnesota's Anishinabe people were not
able to insist on a rigorous evaluation of the environmental and
cultural impact of John D. Rockefeller's mining interests
development and degradation of the Mesabe Iron Range.388 The
usufructuary property rights created in the Treaties of 1795, 1825,
1826, 1837, and 1854; the Executive Order of 1850; and the verbal
assurances of Alexander Ramsey to the Red Lake Band in 1863, 8
did not receive judicial attention until late in the 20 h Century.9
After the Mille Lacs treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
analysis clarified the nature of the interests held by the
Anishinabe, the "Crandon model" was the first example of 21"
Century recognition of 1854 Treaty-guaranteed off-reservation
usufructuary property interests being protected in the
environmental scoping and permitting process. 9'1 As of September
29, 2014, the Sandpiper Pipeline has become the second. 32
alleviate the bottleneck of crude oil that North Dakota is pumping for the
rest of America but for which there aren't enough pipelines or railcars to
ship it to refineries. Sandpiper, if built, would move 15.8 million gallons of
oil a day across northern Minnesota, about 20 percent of all of the crude
out of the Bakken oilfield region ....
Enbridge had expected public hearings to be held on both the need for the
pipeline and the route, simultaneously, over the winter with a final
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission decision coming in May 2015.
Construction would have started after PUC approval.
Now, it appears the pipeline's route and its perceived public need will be
reviewed under a more complex process that separates the public need
hearings from route considerations. The need hearings will be held on the
original schedule, with hearings in January and an administrative law
judge decision in April, Lorraine Little, an Enbridge spokeswoman, said
Tuesday.
It's still unclear how and when the route aspects will advance through the
PUC process.
388. Duluth native Leonidas Merritt and his brothers made some of the most
valuable mining discoveries but sold their interests to John D. Rockefeller who sold
to Andrew Carnegie's U.S. Steel Corporation. See generally DAVID ALLEN WALKER,
IRON FRONTIER: THE DISCOVERY AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MINNESOTA'S THREE
RANGES chs. 5, 7-9 (1979). Id. at pp. 6-7 (talking generally about the Fond du Lac
Treaty and mineral rights).
389. Treaty of Old Crossing, supra note 67. No mention of hunting and fishing
rights, "but the transcript of Ramsey's negotiations with the Band makes clear that
the Indians were promised they could continue to hunt and fish on the ceded land
until it was settled." United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (D.
Minn. 1979).
390. See United States v. Gotchnik (Gotchnik I), 222 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2000);
Mille Lacs 11, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp.
658 (D. Minn. 1991).
391. Rinard & Jones, supra note 373. This outcome is not impacted by the
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VI. FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS OF TRIBAL MEMBERS
FOR EXERCISING TREATY RIGHTS: MILLES LACS
AND TREATY-GUARANTEED USUFRUCTUARY
PROPERTY "IMMUNITY"
A. United States v. Bresette
Twenty years after the district court found that Leech Lake
Band members were immune from state prosecution for violation
of state wildlife regulation on the Leech Lake Reservation in
Herbst, the federal district court in Minnesota decided United
States v. Bresette " In Bresette, a member of the Chippewa Indian
Tribe was charged with a violation of the federal Migratory Bird
Treaty Act" 4 for selling migratory bird feathers in the form of
dream catchers.9 The court held that the defendants had the
right to sell migratory bird feathers obtained from land ceded by
the Chippewa in the Treaties of 1842 and 1854.9 To get to this
conclusion, the court presciently applied the analysis used in Mille
Lacs and found that the "defendants have a treaty right to sell
these bird feathers which has not been abrogated... ,,'9 They
existence of several early treaties that permitted the mining of minerals, logging or
other development, whether the United States gained title to the territory, or not.
ARTICLE 3 - The Chippewa tribe grant to the government of the United
States the right to search for, and carry away any metals or minerals from
any part of their country. But this grant is not to affect the title of the
land, nor the existing jurisdiction over it.
Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa Band of Indians, Aug. 5, 1826,
7 Stat. 290 [hereinafter Treaty of 1826].
392. See Myers, supra note 387.
393. United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Minn. 1991). In
Herbst, Judge Devitt was "satisfied that the Leech Lake Indians held aboriginal
fishing and hunting rights, [and] that these rights were preserved by treaty with
the United States .... " Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.
Supp. 1001, 1006 (D. Minn. 1971). The State did not seriously dispute that the
Leech Lake Indians possessed the claimed fishing and hunting rights, as the
Minnesota Supreme Court had held in the 1944 case State v. Jackson, 16 N.W.2d
752 (Minn. 1944). The district court in Herbst concluded that "[the Indians] have
the right to hunt and fish and gather wild rice on public lands and public waters of
the Leech Lake Reservation free of Minnesota game and fish laws" and
"[d]efendants are enjoined the state from enforcing such laws against them."
Herbst, 334 F. Supp. at 1006.
394. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (2012).
395. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 659.
396. Id. at 660.
397. Id. at 664.
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concluded the Treaties must have contemplated commercial
transactions .
The court referred to the Voigt cases from the Seventh
Circuit,9 which involved the Treaties of 1837, 1842, and 1854.
4
11
In these cases, the Chippewa people ceded territory in the
Northern Great Lakes region to the federal government. 41  The
1854 Treaty covers much of Northeastern Minnesota, including
the Fond du Lac Reservation, and the Voigt cases provided
historical analysis that the Mille Lacs Court would use:
Indian treaty rights are to be afforded a broad construction
and, indeed, are to be interpreted as the Indians understood
them because the Indians were generally unlettered and the
government had great power over the Indians with a
corresponding responsibility toward them.4 2
Thus, the court concluded:
[T]he inclusion in the 1854 treaty of a reservation of
usufructuary rights by the Minnesota Chippewas suggests, in
our view, that the LCO band believed their usufructuary rights
to be secure and unaffected by the treaty.
As discussed earlier, the second clause of the 1854 Treaty also
specifically states that the Mississippi Chippewa west of the
Treaty boundary, in territory that had not been ceded to the United
States as of 1854 as was sovereign under the Treaties of 1825 and 1826,
maintained their previous rights unchanged by the 1854 Treaty.
The territory referenced is the remainder of Minnesota land in which
the Treaties of 1825 and 1826 recognized the Chippewa as
sovereign (as did the 1850 Presidential Order which identified the
territory not ceded by the 1837 Treaty) as the territory to which
removal should occur.
B. United States v. Gotchnik
In 1998, officials of the Forest Service cited two members of
the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa for using motorized vehicles in
''no motor" areas of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness
398. Whether commercial transactions are treaty-protected is at issue in the
current Lacey Act prosecutions of tribal members in the "Squarehook" cases
discussed earlier. See supra note 27.
399. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 660.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 661 (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979)).




("BWCA") in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261(a).4"4 Defendants were
found to be using a motorized canoe and a snowmobile.0 Both
asserted the affirmative defense based on "treaty rights"
guaranteed by the 1854 Treaty, which was without the benefit of
the Mille Lacs treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property analysis
announced in 1999.40" The Eighth Circuit held that treaty-
guaranteed usufructuary rights do not prevail over all types of
regulation on public lands,4 7 particularly when federal wilderness
area is at issue.48 The usufructuary rights remain, but in a form
limited by the wilderness usage regulations imposed by the BWCA
use regulations.
However, this fact-dependent holding was limited by a lack of
evidence that the modern technology, usage, and activity was
equivalent to that anticipated under the 1854 Treaty.41  In
interpreting the reach of the usufructuary rights within the 1854-
ceded territory, the Eighth Circuit held that the off-reservation
use of motorized vehicles by Chippewa Band members was subject
to prohibition in the BWCA despite the unchallenged right of the
Anishinabe to hunt, fish, and gather in the arrowhead region in
Minnesota north of Lake Superior (which was guaranteed by the
1854 Treaty, acknowledged by the State of Minnesota, and
recognized by the Boundary Waters Act, itself.)41  This is because
"travel" was not considered part of the usufructuary "package,"
although the court phrased the question differently in the pre-
Mille Lacs period.412 If evidence does exists that the Anishinabe
made use of wagons, sailboats, railroads, steamboats, or other




407. Gotchnik I, 222 F.3d 506, 511 (8th Cir. 2000).
408. But see Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 662-65 (holding that the usufructuary
rights in the 1842 and 1854 Treaties encompassed the taking of migratory birds,
including eagles, for their feathers for ceremonial purposes despite the limitations
of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703-711) ("In sum,
defendants have a treaty right to sell these bird feathers which has not been
abrogated and is not, under the terms of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, subject to
Puyallup limitation. Defendants have prevailed on their affirmative defense.").
409. Gotchnik I, 222 F.3d at 512.
410. Id. at 510.
411. Id. The Court resolved the contradiction between section seventeen of the
Boundary Waters Act, which provides that nothing in the Act shall affect existing treaties,
and section four, which imposes extensive limitations on motorized transport in the
BWCA because the Bands "presented no evidence, historical or otherwise, to
suggest that the signatories adhered to a different understanding." Id.
412. Id. at 511.
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contemporary 1854 transport in the exercise of their usufructuary
rights, a contrary outcome might be required, but balanced
against a broader area in which usufructuary rights may be
exercised, another outcome may be reached. As noted in both the
LCO litigation and Mille Lacs cases, modern means of
transportation to reach areas in which usufructuary rights might
be exercised is distinguishable from the use of modern equipment
and techniques in the exercise of usufructuary rights to hunt, fish,
and gather.413
However, the Gotchnik opinion does firmly recognize that
interpretation of treaty language depends upon effect given to the
terms of the treaty as the Indian signatories would have
understood them; congressional abrogation of treaty rights
requires "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty." '414 Since the Gotchnik opinion was, as the
court allowed, was not based on a historical and factual record as
to what the Anishinabe understood when signing the Treaty in
1854, and decided without any clear evidence that Congress
intended to abrogate Anishinabe Treaty rights in enacting the
Boundary Waters Act, the issue will have to be revisited in future
negotiations, or litigation, with respect to all of Northern
Minnesota and the Boundary Waters.1
C. United States v. Smiskin
The district court's analysis in Smiskin is informative of
Treaty analyses post-Mille Lacs."' In Smiskin, the federal
government charged two Yakama tribal members with violating
the federal Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act ("CCTA").4 1 7 The
tribe members allegedly transported unstamped cigarettes from
413. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Mille Lacs 11, 952 F. Supp. 1362 (D.
Minn. 1997); Mille Lacs III, 861 F. Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994); Mille Lacs IV, 124
F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997); LCO 11, 760 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); LCO I, 700 F.2d 341
(7th Cir. 1983); LCO III, 758 F. Supp. 1262 (W.D. Wis. 1991); LCO IV, 740 F. Supp.
1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990); LCO V, 707 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D. Wis. 1989); LCO VI, 686 F.
Supp. 226 (W.D. Wis. 1988); LCO VII, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987); LCO
VIII, 653 F. Supp. 1420.
414. Gotchnik I, 222 F.3d at 509.
415. Id.
416. United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2007).
417. Id. at 1262-63.
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smoke shops on an Idaho Indian reservation to smoke shops on
various Indian reservations in Washington.418
The CCTA makes it "unlawful for any person knowingly to
ship, transport, receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase
contraband cigarettes .... ,,41' The CCTA defines contraband
cigarettes as "a quantity in excess of 10,000 cigarettes, which bear
no evidence of the payment of applicable State or local cigarette
taxes in the State or locality where such cigarettes are found," and
in the possession of a person not otherwise authorized by the State
to possess such cigarettes.42 The State of Washington generally
requires wholesalers to affix either a "tax paid" or "tax exempt"
stamp to cigarette packaging prior to sale. 21  Individuals other
than licensed wholesalers must "have given notice to the [Liquor
Control] Board in advance of ... [transporting unstamped
cigarettes]. 2  Yakama tribal members are not exempt from this
pre-notification requirement. 3
The tribe members charged did not give notice to the State
prior to transporting unstamped cigarettes, thus making their
cigarettes unauthorized under state law and contraband under the
CCTA.4 4 The district court interpreted the Yakama Treaty of
1855 to find no legal basis for the Government's prosecution of the
tribe members under the CCTA.25  The district court also held,
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, that the state's
pre-notification requirement violated the "Right to Travel"
provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855, which "secures to
Yakama tribal members the right to travel upon the public
highways. 2 In doing so, the court relied extensively on the Mille
Lacs case and prior precedent in analyzing the interpretation and
application of treaty language:
[T]he Yakama Treaty, and the Right to Travel provision in
particular, were of tremendous importance to the Yakama
Nation when the Treaty was signed... [and], although the
United States "negotiated with the Northwest tribes many
treaties containing parallel provisions," a "public highways
clause" promising a right to travel is found in only one other
418. Id. at 1263.
419. 18 U.S.C. § 2342(a) (2013).
420. Id. § 2341(2).
421. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.030 (2013).
422. Id. § 82.24.250(1).
423. Smiskin, 487 F.3d at 1263.
424. Id.







The Supreme Court's jurisprudence makes clear, however, that
we must interpret a treaty right in light of the particular
tribe's understanding of that right at the time the treaty was
made .... 421 (citing Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 201-02) (noting
that similar language in two treaties may have different
meanings because the Court examines 'the historical record
and.., the context of the treaty negotiations to discern what
the parties intended by their choice of words').429
The court had already held in Cree II that the Yakama Treaty
Right to Travel guaranteed tribe members the "right to transport
goods to market over public highways without payment of fees for
that use. 430
Following the Mille Lacs analysis, the Smiskin district court
held that "the Yakamas understood the Treaty at the time of
signing to 'unambiguously reserve to [them] the right to travel the
public highways without restriction for purposes of hauling goods
to market,'431 and that both parties to the treaty expressly intended
that the Yakamas would retain their right to travel outside
reservation boundaries, with no conditions attached.432 Therefore,
the pre-notification requirement is a restriction and condition on
the right to travel that violates the Yakama Treaty.4 Further, in
interpreting the treaty rights as the Indians understood them, the
court held that usufructuary rights include "the right to sell the
fruit of the land" and "commercial activity.,
4 4
427. Id. at 1265 (citing Yakama Indian Nation v. Flores, 955 F. Supp. 1229, 1238
(E.D. Wash. 2007)) (citations omitted).
428. Id. at 1267.
429. Id. at n.11.
430. Cree v. Flores, 157 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1996).
431. Smiskin, 487 F.3d at 1266 (quoting Flores, 955 F. Supp. at 1248) (emphasis
added).
432. Id. at 1266 (quoting Flores, 955 F. Supp. at 1251) (emphasis added).
433. Id. ("Applying either type of requirement to the Yakamas imposes a
condition on travel that violates their treaty right to transport goods to market
without restriction. Thus, just as the State cannot issue citations to tribal
members for not paying fees before they bring lumber to market, the federal
government cannot impose criminal sanctions on tribal members for not providing
notice to the State before transporting tobacco for sale or trade.").
434. United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 662 (D. Minn. 1991).
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D. Federal Lacey Act "Sting" Prosecutions of Minnesota
Chippewa for On-Reservation Exercise of Treaty-
Guaranteed Usufructuary Rights
Recently, federal law enforcement sting operations in
Minnesota resulted in federal criminal indictments under the
Lacey Act of 19004"' against several members of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe for violation of tribal on-reservation fishing
regulations.436 These prosecutions are the first of their kind
brought in federal court against tribal band members for violation
of tribal wildlife regulations on a reservation. It has long been
established that band members are immune from such
prosecutions for violations of state regulations.4 7
Whether this is a legitimate exercise of federal jurisdiction,
in light of the treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property precedent
of Mille Lacs, is a test of the scope of property interests conveyed
by U.S. treaty negotiators in the language of the Treaties at issue
as well as the intention of Congress to abrogate any or all treaty-
guaranteed usufructuary property interests in the manner
required by Menominee."8 This prosecution occurred despite the
Lacey Act specifically stating that "[nothing in this chapter shall
be construed as... repealing, superseding, or modifying any right,
privilege, or immunity granted, reserved, or established pursuant
to treaty, statute, or executive order pertaining to any Indian
tribe, band or community... ."" From the original passage of the
Act in 1900 until the 1988 Lacey Act Amendments, there was no
evidence that Congress intended for the Lacey Act to affect treaty
agreements. In 1988 however, amendments to the Lacey Act
435. Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378
(2014)).
436. Doug Smith, Major Fish-Poaching Scheme Busted in Northern Minnesota,
Authorities Say, STAR TRIB., http://www.startribune.comlocal/202443861.html (last
updated Apr. 15, 2013, 12:51 AM).
437. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1006
(D. Minn. 1971).
438. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
439. 16 U.S.C. § 3378(c)(2).
440. See id. §§ 3371-3378. See also Lacey Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988)). "Nothing in this
Act should be construed to prevent the several states or Indian tribes from making
or enforcing laws or regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1981)). United States v. Brown, 13-68
(JRT/LIB), 13-70 (JRT/LIB) WL 6175202 at *9 (D. Minn. 2013) (citing S. REP. No.
97-123, 18, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1765) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as enlarging or diminishing the authority of any state or Indian tribe to regulate
the activities of persons within the Indian reservations. The Committee recognizes
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established federal criminal jurisdiction for violations of Indian
tribal regulations in the same way violations of state wildlife
regulations had provided a basis for federal jurisdiction in earlier
versions of the Act. 1
The current language of the Lacey Act, like the Cigarette Tax
Contract ("CTC") language in Smiskin, relies upon violations of
state law as a trigger to federal jurisdiction.442  The 1988
Amendment adds Indian laws and statutes as precursors, despite
the exclusionary original language of the Act.443 In United States
v. Brown, Judge John Tunheim held that the Band members were
immune, applying the treaty analysis of usufructuary property
444principles from the Mille Lacs opinion. Citing Gotchnik, the
court found that the defendants "clearly possess the right to hunt
and fish in the ceded territory" under the Band's Treaty, and that
the right has not been abrogated, as "the Court has found no
Supreme Court precedent, and the Government has presented
none, endorsing an approach that looks for a treaty to exempt
Indians from the application of a federal law rather than for the
federal statute to abrogate the treaty rights. 445 A brief history of
the Lacey Act demonstrates the recent vintage of the
interpretation of the Lacey Act to apply to Indians on reservations
when these Indians are charged with exercising treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property rights as described by the Court in the
Mille Lacs opinion.
i. Passage and Brief History of the Lacey Act 1900-1988
Iowa Congressman John Lacey first introduced the Lacey Act
to the House of Representatives in the spring of 1900.44' He
intended the law to "enlarge the powers of the Department of
that there is a continuing controversy about the extent of state and tribal
jurisdiction over resources within Indian reservations and regarding non-Indians
on those reservations. Nothing in this Act is intended to preempt whatever
jurisdiction individual states may have over resources within Indian Reservations
under existing law, nor is it intended to alter or change the existing authority of
Indian tribes over resources within their reservations.").
441. Lacey Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified
as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988)).
442. Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378
(2014)).
443. Lacey Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified
as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988)).
444. United States v. Brown, 13-68 (JRT/LIB), 13-70 (JRT/LIB) WL 6175202 at
*10 (D. Minn. 2013).
445. Id. at *4-5.
446. The Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2014)).
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Agriculture," with the purpose of. (a) authorizing introduction and
preservation of game, song, and wild birds; (b) preventing the
"unwise" introduction of foreign birds and animals; and (c)
supplementing state laws for the protection of game and birds.
447
The original Lacey Act also addressed game poaching and wildlife
"laundering," which had been fostered by limitations on state
control over merchandise traveling in interstate commerce.
4
41
The inability of state laws to address these scenarios
stemmed from the "state ownership" doctrine, in which states were
considered to own all the wildlife found within their borders and
had exclusive power to restrict the export of such wildlife.44 9 The
state ownership doctrine was finally overturned in Hughes v.
Oklahoma .4 " The second doctrine that prevented direct state
regulation of imported wildlife prior to the Lacey Act arose from a
series of judicial decisions strictly construing the Commerce
Clause to preclude state control over virtually any item in
interstate commerce.4 1
The Black Bass Act of 1926
The original Lacey Act did not apply to fish. 2 In 1926, the
Black Bass Act453 aimed to augment state laws and expanded the
Lacey Act's provisions by prohibiting the transport of fish that had
been sold, purchased, or possessed in violation of state or
447. Lacey told his colleagues about the agricultural damage that had
accompanied the decline in bird populations. Lacey spoke of having recently
discussed some worm-infested apples with a fellow House member. "'Well,' said I,
'my friend, the killing of the birds causes this condition-man kills the birds that
killed the insect that laid the egg that hatched the worm that defiled the
apple.'... The destruction of the insectivorous birds has resulted in the loss of our
fruit." 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900) (statement of Rep. Lacey).
448. 33 CONG. REC. 4872 (1900). See, e.g., People v. Buffalo Fish Co., 58 N.E. 34
(N.Y. 1900). It was common at that time for large numbers of game to be killed by
poachers (known as market-hunters or "pothunters") in one state, and shipped to
another state for sale to the public. A second common problem involved local game
killed during a state's closed season and sold under the guise of having been
brought into the state from elsewhere.
449. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
450. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
451. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chi. Ry. Co., 125
U.S. 465 (1888). The Supreme Court declared in Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58
(1897) that, because liquor was a lawful item of interstate commerce, states could
not control its importation or sale within their borders.
452. See Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2014)).
453. Black Bass Act, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (1926), repealed by Lacey Act




territorial law, as well as those killed illegally.5 4 In 1930, the
Black Bass Act was expanded to: (a) prohibit not only the
transportation but also the receipt for transportation of illegal
bass; (b) include bass that had been "caught, killed, taken, sold,
purchased, possessed, or transported" contrary to state law; (c)
require accurate labeling of bass shipments; and (d) make all bass
within a state subject to the state's laws.
In 1947, the Black Bass Act was expanded to cover all "game
fish," as that term was defined in state laws.456  The statute was
amended to cover game fish taken, transported, purchased, or sold
contrary to state or "other applicable law.4 5 7 In 1952, the Black
Bass Act was amended again.45 8  The Bill had three stated
purposes: (1) to develop a list of endangered species and regulate
trade in them in order to assist in global species preservation; (2)
to strengthen the Lacey Act's provisions to provide more protection
for domestically endangered species; and (3) to authorize the
purchase of private land for wildlife conservation purposes.
1969 Endangered Species Act and Lacey Act Amendments
In 1969, Congress passed a bill that contained amendments
to the Lacey and Black Bass Acts, as well as the nation's second
version of the Endangered Species Act.460  Section 2 of the Black
Bass Act read as follows, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) to deliver or receive for transportation, or... for any person
knowingly to transport, by any means whatsoever, in
interstate or foreign commerce, any black bass or other fish, if
such person knows and in the exercise of due care should
know that
454. 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900) (statement of Rep. Lacey). The term "law" was
not defined in the Act, but was held by the Supreme Court in 1957 to include
regulations promulgated by the Florida Game Commission, based on explicit rule-
making powers granted to the commission and clear congressional intent to include
such regulations within the scope of the Black Bass Act. United States v. Howard,
352 U.S. 212,218-19 (1957).
455. Act of July 2, 1930, ch. 801, §§ 2-4, 46 Stat. 845, 845-46 (1930).
456. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 348, 61 Stat. 517 (1946). During congressional
hearings, an undersecretary of the Department of the Interior suggested that the
Act be expanded to cover game fish taken illegally on lands under federal
jurisdiction, such as national parks and Indian reservations. But this language
relating to treaties was not added to the statute.
457. Id.
458. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 911, 66 Stat. 736 (1952).
459. S. REP. No. 526, at 1-2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413.
460. Endangered Species Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969).
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(A) such delivery or transportation is contrary to the law
of the State or any foreign country from which such
black bass or other fish is or is found or transported, or
is contrary to other applicable law, or
(B) such black bass or other fish has been either caught,
killed, taken, sold, purchased, possessed, or transported,
at any time, contrary to the law of the State or foreign
country in which it was in which it was caught, killed,
taken, sold, purchased, or possessed, or from which it
was transported or contrary to other applicable law ...
461
1981 Combination of the Lacey and Black Bass Acts
In 1981, Congress again addressed the Lacey and Black Bass
Acts, prompted by "massive illegal trade in fish and wild life"
which was perpetrated by well-organized, large-volume criminal
operations, which generated substantial profits and created "grim
environmental consequences," according to congressional
findings.42  Noting that the two Acts needed to keep pace with
fast-growing global trade in illegal wildlife, the two laws were
combined in Title 16 in the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981.43
ii. The 1988 Lacey Act Amendments Add Tribal Regulation
of Usufructuary Property Rights to Trigger Federal
Prosecution on Reservations
This brief history makes plain that the Lacey Act does not
embody an unambiguous congressional purpose to abrogate pre-
existing treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights at the
level required to accomplish the task described in Menominee.
4 14
The 1988 amendments provided the first indication of the
exception for tribal members exercising their federally guaranteed
usufructuary property rights, but not whether this was an
intended or unintended byproduct of the amendment.4  The
461. Id. § 9, 83 Stat. at 281-82 (repealed 1981).
462. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1981)). See also H.R. REP. No. 276, at 1, 5
(1981); S. REP. No. 276, at 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748.
463. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1981)).
464. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
465. "[Alreas traditionally left to tribal self-government, those most often the
subject of treaties, have enjoyed an exception from the general rule that
congressional enactments, in terms applying to all persons, includes Indians and
their property interests." United States v. Brown, 13-68 (JRT/LIB), 13-70
(JRT/LIB), 2013 WL 6175202, at *10 n.6 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2013) (citing United
States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1974)).
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language of subsection 3372(a)(1), which referred to the taking or
possession of wildlife in violation of federal or tribal law, was in
contradiction with subsections 3372(a)(2) and (a)(3), which had
applied to wildlife "taken, possessed, transported or sold" in
violation of state or foreign law.6 Congress amended subsection
3372(a)(1) so that the language pertaining to the types of sufficient
underlying violations mirrored that of the companion sections.6 7
However, in light of existing Supreme Court precedent cited
in Mille Lacs such as the Menominee and Dion opinions,"8 and the
prefatory language of the Lacey Act itself,"' abrogation by
criminalization of Treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property rights
cannot be so casually imposed upon those whose right to a modest
living is recognized by a unanimous Supreme Court.70 Like the
Smiskin federal prosecution, violation of local or tribal regulation
is a necessary precursor to the invocation of federal jurisdiction
under the CTC7 1 and the Lacey Act, but the language on the face
of the original Lacey Act is particularly solicitous of pre-existing
rights, privileges, and immunities, pertaining to any Indian tribe,
specifically stating that "[niothing in this chapter shall be
construed as... repealing, superseding, or modifying any right,
privilege, or immunity granted, reserved, or established pursuant
to treaty, statute, or executive order pertaining to any Indian
tribe, band or community .... ,47 2  In the Justice Department's
Eighth Circuit Brief, the United States argued that amendments
from 1988 in which Congress authorized federal prosecution of
band members for violation of "tribal laws" is sufficient
congressional authorization to abrogate both the prefatory
language of the Lacey Act and the multiple treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property rights that ran with the land, at least in the
manner recognized in Menominee some fifty years ago."'
The Government's analysis of the Judge Tunheim decision
demonstrates that the court applied the Mille Lacs treaty-
466. See, e.g., Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 § 3, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat.
1073 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1981)).
467. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1).
468. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Menominee, 391 U.S. at 404.
469. 16 U.S.C. § 3371-3378.
470. See generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172 (1999); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Menominee, 391 U.S. at
404.
471. United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2007).
472. 16 U.S.C. § 3378(c)(2).
473. See Opening Brief for the United States of America, United States v. Brown
(No. 13-3800), 2014 WL 6175202, (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2014).
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guaranteed usufructuary property analysis by relying on the
specific treaties and the specific historical context in which the
1837 Treaty was drafted by U.S. treaty negotiators:
[T]he district court first concluded that the 1837 Treaty
granted an "exclusive" right to hunt and fish .. that this right
is held by and can be asserted by, individual tribal
members .... [H]e found "no indication in the text of the
Lacey Act that Congress intended to abrogate individual
Chippewa members' fishing rights ... the district court
concluded the 1837 Treaty provides individual tribal members
414immunity from federal prosecution ....
The application of the relevant Treaty and federal statute is
completely consistent with the unanimous Court's methodology in
Mille Lacs and its long-established precedential companion
Menominee. The decision of the Eighth Circuit on the question of
a Chippewa Band member's immunity from federal prosecution for
violation of tribal game regulations under the principles upheld
unanimously by the Court in Mille Lacs will mark another step in
the development of treaty-guaranteed usufructuary property
interests in the 21" Century.
CONCLUSION
The unanimity of the Supreme Court in Mille Lacs regarding
the method for determining the existence of treaty-guaranteed
usufructuary property rights in the language used by U.S. treaty
negotiators, within the closely divided 5-4 opinion on the merits,
requires a re-examination of a previously well-settled precedent
and previously unexamined treaty-guaranteed usufructuary
property interests in light of the Mille Lacs opinion.475 The Mille
Lacs majority points to the language in two contemporaneous
treaties with the Chippewa to demonstrate that professional
negotiators drafted treaties that did not, retain usufructuary
property rights on territory ceded to the United States by the
Chippewa.476
Only by examining each treaty applicable to the territory in
question, in light of the Mille Lacs methodology, is it possible to
determine whether usufructuary property rights were retained
from the fee simple bundle of property interests for which the
treaty negotiators bargained, in relation to the territory in
question. Then, tracing those bargained-for ususfructuary
474. Id. at 11 (United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986)) (emphasis
added).
475. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
476. Id. at 196.
[Vol. 33: 143
USUFRUCTUARY PROPERTY RIGHTS
property interests to the present to determine whether Congress
acted to abrogate the treaty-guaranteed property interest in
language intended for that purpose, understood as such by the
native signatories to the treaties.
Since this usufructuary property-oriented analysis of treaty
rights emerged in the Voigt litigation in the Seventh Circuit and
was adopted unanimously by the Supreme Court in the Mille Lacs
opinion in 1999, this analysis has been reflected in a wide range of
wildlife and environmental regulations and as a defense to state
and federal criminal prosecution of Native Americans. Moreover,
the joint resource management model, in place in Wisconsin for
more than twenty years, or the state lease model that Minnesota
has adopted,477 both demonstrate these are currently-existing
property rights that are likely to be expanded to all of Northern
Minnesota in the near future. But perhaps more importantly, as
the Wisconsin post-LCO Environmental Impact Statements from
the Crandon Mine siting dispute demonstrate, U.S. treaty-
guaranteed Anishinabe usufructuary property rights have to be
part of the equation when both on- and off-reservation natural
resources in Northern Minnesota are developed or regulated.
This method of usufructuary property rights analysis set
forth by the Supreme Court in the Mille Lacs opinion is not
limited to the Anishinabe Treaties in Minnesota, although the
Chippewa Treaties are convenient examples of the larger
historical reality in which the Mille Lacs Supreme Court opinion
can be situated. Other treaties with other tribes will have
different language, histories, and characteristics that come down
to the present and must be analyzed to determine whether treaty-
guaranteed usufructuary property interests, or other protectable
interests, remain viable in the present. Meticulous historical and
contextual research, as well as factual development to support the
scope of usufructuary property interests at the time the treaty is
signed is necessary for each treaty in question.
But, conceptualizing treaties as property-creating
instruments, well-rooted in Roman and Common Law property
principles subject to constitutional protections, can be a starting
place for a treaty jurisprudence that makes use of property-based
legal concepts to empower those without power in the way that
Goldberg v. Kelly"' property-based jurisprudence brought power to
477. Id.
478. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary
hearing before a recipient of government benefits can be deprived of those benefits.
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those who had only an "expectation interest" in continuing to
receive government benefits, at another time in history.
Usufructuary property interests, created by treaty guarantees
made by United States treaty negotiators and not abrogated by
Congress, 4" are property worthy of constitutional protection no
less than any other.
479. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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